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Attention has been drawn to the observation that environmental 
benefits under the current regulatory approaches are diminishing with 
respect to increased pollution control costs.  Regulators have begun to 
appreciate that while environmental gains can still be achieved under the 
current command and control system, the most significant 
environmental gains have already been made, and an alternative 
regulatory approach might be warranted for continued environmental 
improvement. This study found that regulatory initiatives that seek to 
address business incentives and disincentives may yield better 
environmental outcomes. 
Internal characteristics such as corporate environmental 
directives, waste audit and environmental performance tracking systems 
and linkage of compensation to environmental performance are evident 
in firms that have attempted to adapt to regulatory pressures.  These 
characteristics, according to organizational models, are posited to 
Redacted for Privacyimprove the environmental performance of firms as environmental issues 
are linked to key business decisions. 
This study was conducted by surveying firms in the forest products 
industry. Certain firms were found to exhibit specific internal 
characteristics indicative of good environmental performance. The study 
attempts to identify the implication this finding has on regulators in 
terms of policy design and implementation. 
The study suggests that the optimum regulatory strategy is a 
hybrid of a command and control approach and a market-based 
approach which blends the compliance assurance of the command and 
control approach to address motivating firm behavior with the flexibility 
of the market-based approach to provide firms incentives to improve 
environmental performance. 
The study concludes that the value of such a hybrid approach 
which attempts to address firm incentives and disincentives related to 
their environmental practices will result in improved environmental 
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Introduction 
Environmental regulation of industrial sources of pollutants for the 
past two decades has potentially reached a point of reduced marginal 
returns related to increased pollution control investments. Cairncross 
(1991), a market-based regulatory advocate, stated that "As 
environmental standards tighten, diminishing environmental returns set 
in." America spends over 2 percent of the gross domestic product on 
pollution control and the cost is rising. U.S. firms spent $115 billion 
dollars in 1990 complying with environmental regulations  This is 
estimated to increase to $170-185 billion by the turn of the century (US 
EPA, 1990). 
Past U.S. environmental regulation has typically taken a broad, 
command-and-control tack  a one-size-fits-all approach characterized 
by prescriptive features and end-of-pipe technology. This philosophy had 
little regard to organizational differences, much less different firm 
incentives and disincentives related to compliance. While this broad, 
prescriptive approach represented a rational response to the national 
environmental crisis of the 1960s, the approach may have outlived its 
usefulness. This command-and-control approach was highly successful 
in achieving significant environmental gains, and will continue to play a 2 
major role in any environmental regulatory program.  However, future 
environmental regulatory strategies may need to evolve through 
alternative approaches. 
Environmental regulations seek to change organizational behavior. 
The key to inducing any change in organizations is to identify forces that 
motivate such changes in behavior. The primary assertion of this 
research is that the development of effective environmental strategies will 
require greater knowledge of factors that motivate and inhibit firms to 
adapt to regulatory demands, and that organizations can assist 
environmental agencies to accomplish this objective. 
The goal of this research is to recommend an alternative regulatory 
strategy for industrial sources of air pollution in the state of Oregon. 
This approach will seek to address business incentives and barriers to 
improve environmental performance. The recommendation is a 
culmination of the survey results, informal interviews and the synthesis 
of the related literature. The objectives of this research were to: 
1.	  Describe an array of environmental regulatory choices; 
2.	  Examine the research literature to determine important incentives 
and disincentives for firms to achieve good environmental 
performance, and organizational models describing how firms 
adapt to regulatory pressures; 
3.	  Survey personnel at two large forest products firms to 
determine their opinions on the relative importance of identified 
environmental performance factors; 3 
4.	  Interview city, state and federal environmental agency personnel, 
academe, industry representative and consultants to determine 
factors important to firms as they seek to adapt to external 
pressures; 
5.	  Provide results and conclusions of company surveys; and 
6.	  Recommend an alternative regulatory approach for industrial 
sources of air pollution which seeks to address business incentives 
and disincentives to improve environmental performance. 4 
Literature Review
 
Recent research in regulatory approaches and organizational 
theory includes an emerging sector of methodology to improve the 
effectiveness of environmental regulations. A major difficulty in this type 
of research is identifying specific variables that affect performance. 
Another difficulty is unpacking broad factors describing organizational 
behavior. Many factors drive behavior and a clear cut causal 
relationship between performance and regulatory approaches has proven 
hard to establish. In addition, adequate data are typically absent. 
Environmental agencies do not routinely collect data that are required for 
an integrated assessment of regulatory approaches. 
Specifically related to this research, atmospheric air emissions 
data tend to lack both precision and accuracy. Reaching conclusions as 
to the effectiveness of any given regulatory approach over time in 
accomplishing the initial goal is especially difficult. For example, the 
EPA just recently attempted a self-assessment of the Clean Air Act after 
two decades of regulating air pollution sources at a cost to society of 
approximately $25 billion a year. Critics say the data are suspect and 
EPA overestimates the environmental gains (Crandall et al. 1996). 
Much of the regulatory literature has examined organizational 
structures, decision making models, and strategic planning. Less has 
been written specifically on examining characteristics that contribute to 
a company's environmental performance. Even less has been written on 
the effect of agency-firm interaction on performance. Some of the 
analysis contained herein has been deduced from organizational theory 5 
and a basic understanding of how organizations assimilate external 
pressures. Other conclusions have been drawn from work done on 
corporate social responsibility, which captures the company's 
commitment to societal values, environmental stewardship and 
production sector responsibility. 
The literature review focuses on corporate responses to external 
pressures including environmental regulations. The review attempts to 
develop a linkage between organizational characteristics and 
environmental performance. 
Environmental Regulations 
The hierarchy to environmental regulations typically begins with 
policy as: 
NATIONAL LEVEL  Policy 
sl, 
STATE LEVEL  Environmental Program 
4, 
Air  Water Waste 
Hazardous  Solid 
4, 
Regulations 
Command & Control  Market-based 6 
While the State environmental agency in Oregon, Oregon 
Department of Environmental Quality, establishes some air quality 
policies, most policy is set at a national level. The state environmental 
agency is primarily responsible for implementing regulations, programs, 
special projects and initiatives to accomplish policy objectives. An 
example of an environmental policy might be reduction of hazardous air 
pollutants. There are three environmental program areas in Oregon: air 
quality, water quality and wastes (hazardous and solid).  This study 
focuses on the air quality program which is directed by the Clean Air Act. 
An example of regulations or standards linked to the policy of 
reducing hazardous air pollutants is National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants or "NESHAP's". This regulatory "approach" is 
based on design standards, which are described in the following section. 
An example of a regulatory initiative or "tool" is technical assistance. Its 
relation to policy is: 
Policy  Reduce hazardous air pollutants 
Regulation  NESHAP 
Regulatory Approach  Design standard (may be considered 
command and control or market-
based) 
Regulatory tool  Technical assistance 
Most environmental regulations are either considered command 
and control or market-based, although there are gradations.  Command 
and control and market-based headings refer to broad regulatory 
approaches which characterize the general approach of certain 
regulations and tools. The degree of implementation flexibility offered to 
firms is the distinction. Tradeoffs exist within either approach. While 
command and control regulations provide firms and the agency certainty 7 
resulting from a high degree of specificity (not to be confused with 
regulatory clarity), choices are restricted in how firms demonstrate 
compliance. Market-based regulations allow firms choices in  meeting 
environmental standards, but agency administrative costs are very high 
relative to command and control. 
Command and Control Regulations 
A command and control approach has been historically used to 
regulate major industrial sources of air pollution since the 1970s. Critics 
refer to the command and control approach as draconian.  Proponents 
say it leaves little to doubt and provides necessary assurance of 
compliance. Despite the debate, significant environmental gains have 
been accomplished under this approach although there is considerable 
pressure from industry to consider alternative schemes. Command and 
control regulations are often heavily criticized as ignoring more cost-
effective choices for controlling or preventing pollution. 
"New Source Review" air quality regulations are an example of a 
regulation based on a command and control approach. These are some 
of the most stringent air quality regulations and are required of any 
major new source or a major modification of an existing source.  These 
regulations are designed to either shift an area from non-attainment, or 
to insure continued attainment for the area. These regulations allow for 
industrial growth in non-attainment areas as long as new sources of air 
pollution "offset" their growth to insure the area does not worsen. "New 
Source Review" is a critical component of a state's air program because it 
monitors and sets minimum requirements for new sources of air 
pollution. 8 
Sources subject to New Source Review in a non-attainment area 
must install state-of-the-art control equipment without regard to cost in 
order to achieve the lowest available emission rate. In addition, they 
have to offset their proposed increase by securing an emission reduction 
from an existing source in the area of the proposed increase, by an 
amount equal to or greater than the increase, depending on the severity 
of the area. Finally, these sources have to conduct an alternative 
analysis evaluating alternative sites, production processes, and other 
factors to demonstrate that the benefits of siting the proposed source in a 
non-attainment area significantly outweigh the environmental and social 
costs associated with siting the source. 
One of the main problems with a command and control approach 
is that it fixes both outcome and process at facilities.  If the regulation 
specifies the required technology to be applied (not all command and 
control regulations do), firms lose innovative opportunities, cost-effective 
choices, and participation in decisions that can significantly impact their 
business. 
The following are examples of regulatory approaches and tools. All 
of these with the exception of technical assistance, are federally 
mandated. Some of these approaches may generally be considered either 
command and control or market-based. Some regulations may be viewed 
as flexible in terms of one element, such as not specifying the control 
technology, but inflexible in terms of other requirements such as 
prescriptive administrative requirements. Implementation flexibility 
refers not only to whether control technology requirements are specified, 
but to other regulatory requirements such as specifying operating 9 
parameters, reporting, monitoring, source testing, recordkeeping and 
other compliance related issues. 
Performance Based Standards 
Performance based standards are generally considered a market-
based regulation primarily because firms may choose what control 
technology is applied to meet the standard, which offers firms 
considerable flexibility. These standards specify the end result but do 
not specify how the end result is accomplished.  However, the standard 
may heavily imply a certain technology (e.g. few control choices exist to 
meet the standard). An example of a performance based standard is 
"New Source Performance Standards" for municipal solid waste landfills 
to control their gaseous emissions. The standard is stated as "A control 
system designed and operated to reduce nonmethane organic compound 
emissions by 98 percent" (Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 49,  1996). This 
regulation may give guidance on what control technologies can achieve 
the standard, but the landfill operator is allowed to choose a particular 
technology. 
Performance based standards can allow companies to choose cost-
effective or innovative approaches to meet emission standards. 
Design Standards 
Design standards apply to sources in a particular category and 
establish the emission reduction achievable by a "model" group 
comprised of the best performers in that category. These standards are 
prescribed by EPA to apply stringent control technology requirements. 10
 
Hazardous air pollutants are regulated under this approach. For 
instance, dry cleaners emitting over a certain threshold are subject to 
standards requiring installation of control technology known as "MACT" 
(Maximum Achievable Control Technology). These standards resulted 
from evaluating the top 12 percent of drycleaners related to reduced 
emissions. Sources subject to these standards may propose alternative 
control technologies provided equivalent emission reductions to the 
model group are achieved. This allows some flexibility for companies to 
remove barriers to comply. 
Product Bans and Limitations 
Another example of a regulatory approach used to control or 
prevent pollution is product bans and limitations. This tool either bans 
use or manufacture of a product, or places restrictions on its use or 
manufacture. A specific example is tributylin (TBT), an ingredient used in 
various coatings and solutions for a variety of consumer and industrial 
applications such as a plastics anti-yellowing agent, a slimicide in 
cooling towers, a biocide in "odor eaters" shoe inserts. TBT was also used 
in household paints for bathrooms and other areas subject to high 
moisture. Its most widespread use is an antifouling ingredient in marine 
coatings for vessel hulls and marine pilings to prevent barnacle buildup. 
TBT has been found to concentrate in marine species such as 
shellfish, salmon and halibut, and results in significant ecological 
toxicity causing abnormal growth and mortality. In addition, consumers 
were getting sick after applying TBT-containing paints, especially in 
enclosed spaces such as bathrooms. Once the effects of TBT were 
understood, its use was banned for some applications and restricted in 11
 
others. Management practices are now required in shipyards where 
hulls of marine vessels are sandblasted including shrouding during 
sandblasting and careful storage and disposal of TBT-containing 
sandblast grit. TBT-containing paints were banned for household use. 
Pollution Charges 
This is an example of an economic incentive regulatory approach 
which assesses fixed and variable costs for discharges into the 
environment. Examples of fixed costs are base permitting fees and a 
fixed dollar amount for each unit of pollution. Costs for subsequent 
permit modifications vary depending on the complexity of the 
modification. The Clean Air Act requires that a state's operating permit 
program be fully supported by fees where states may request annual 
increases not to exceed the Consumer Price Index. Economists and 
market-based advocates such as Cairncross (1991) strongly argue in 
favor of economic instruments ("pay to pollute") to achieve environmental 
goals. Companies with financial constraints may seek lower cost options 
under economic instruments, but they may also be forced into 
noncompliance due to an inability to pay. 
Market-Based Regulations 
Market-based regulations are relatively new in practice, although 
the idea was discussed in the economics field over thirty years ago. A 
regulation that is market-based is emissions trading. There are two 
types of emissions trading: "open" and "closed". The most notable 
example of closed market trading is found in Los Angelos and is 
administered by South Coast Air Quality District which regulates the 12 
most polluted air in the country. Their trading program, "RECLAIM", is 
federally mandated to ratchet down emissions of all applicable sources 
by establishing an annual "emissions cap" that sources may not exceed. 
If a source is able to reduce emissions below the cap, they may "trade" 
the reduction to another source who buys it to comply with RECLAIM. 
Depending on pollution control equipment costs, a ton of a given 
pollutant could run into the thousands. 
The idea behind a closed market trading program is to tightly 
control the sources in an airshed and to ratchet air emissions down over 
time. Each year the cap shrinks until the ultimate future reduction goal 
is met. Closed market trading programs are mandatory programs for 
non-attainment areas struggling to achieve attainment. 
The emissions trading that takes place in Oregon is under an open 
market system which is completely voluntary. Trades in Oregon are 
primarily restricted to companies needing to obtain reductions (e.g. 
"offsets") to satisfy one requirement, "New Source Review." For some 
non-attainment areas, the offset requirement is 10 percent greater than 
the proposed increase from the new source which should result in a net 
air quality benefit. This offset is purchased from an existing source who 
is emitting the same pollutant, under similar conditions (e.g., same stack 
height). Since offsets represent a monetary value, companies may be 
motivated to reduce emissions below regulatory requirements if offset 
values more than pay for the costs of such additional reductions. 13
 
Bubbling 
Bubbling is a way for a firm to exceed an emissions standard of 
one polluting unit (e.g. under-control a boiler) as long as they over­
control another polluting unit subject to the same standard, as long as 
the weighted average of the two units meet the standard.  This allows 
firms to seek out cost-effective solutions to meeting emission standards. 
This approach offers considerable flexibility in meeting regulatory 
requirements, and removes financial barriers to perform; however, 
bubbling is restricted to certain parts of a facility based on compliance 
demonstration limitations. 
Technical Assistance 
Technical assistance is a regulatory initiative offered to regulated 
sources either as part of a compliance action, or non-enforcement action. 
Under either option, technical assistance from the agency can provide 
firms valuable assistance to help them comply with regulations and may 
include regulatory interpretation, compliance information, help in 
establishing waste management systems, waste minimization, waste 
reduction, identifying pollution prevention opportunities and calculation 
of emissions for reporting. Technical assistance may be done during a 
routine inspection by the regulatory agency, or in meetings or 
conversations between the agency and source, or as requested by the 
firm. It also can be accomplished internally by staff at the company, by 
consultants or attorneys, or through attendance at an organizational 
meeting or conference. 14 
Technical assistance has removed many barriers to environmental 
performance including a poor understanding of regulatory requirements. 
In addition, it has aided regulatory agencies in developing a greater 
understanding of company's operational problems. Companies may feel 
more likely to discuss an upcoming project and corresponding regulatory 
implications under conditions of having an established relationship with 
the agency. An ongoing dialogue between the company and the 
regulatory agency has been cited as one of the most important 
components to environmental performance. Technical assistance can be 
a very powerful tool which can establish a crucial link between firm and 
agency, solve misunderstandings about regulatory requirements and 
may help to develop a cooperative relationship to further environmental 
performance. 
All regulatory instruments have strengths and weaknesses that 
involve tradeoffs. Many of the tradeoffs are related to the resources 
necessary for firm and agency to implement the regulation. Emissions 
trading for instance provides an economic incentive for sources to reduce 
emissions below regulatory requirements. However, it has high agency 
administrative costs, which include EPA oversight for approval of each 
individual trade. 
There is no perfect regulatory instrument to solve all problems of 
ease of implementation, how it affects innovation, administrative costs 
and impact to the environment. As environmental agencies consider the 
mix of regulatory instruments to accomplish federal mandates and policy 
requirements, they need to understand how firms respond to regulatory 
approaches, what internal incentives and external motivators exist in 15
 
order to attempt to seek to address these factors in developing a 
regulatory approach that yields improved environmental outcomes. 
Understanding Corporate Response to Environmental Regulatory 
Pressures 
Environmental issues reach every facet of business. What once 
was reserved for legal and engineering departments, now affects every 
aspect of production and planning including: human resources (risk 
exposure), operations (emissions), research and development, marketing 
and strategic positioning. Post (1991) stated that strategic and 
operational decisions are affected on a daily basis: "How a firm fuels its 
fleet of cars and trucks, designs energy efficiency into a facility, organizes 
employee transportation and communicates about all of this to 
communities and government officials affects its environmental profile." 
Post argued that the commitment to be environmentally responsible 
cannot be met without addressing all of these elements of corporate 
activity. 
Most organizational models that seek to explain how firms respond 
to external pressures describe an adaptation to the pressure that 
progresses along a continuum. Post and Altman (1992), Little (1989), 
Hunt and Aster (1990) and Schot (1991) all described firms as moving 
through phases related to environmental management. The beginning 
phases are mostly reactionary with little environmental planning. In 
later stages management becomes fully integrated. Before 1989, Little 
(1989) found only 10-15 percent of firms in the first and last phases. 
Hunt and Aster (1990) found that most firms were still in a reactive 16 
mode, with just a few firms in the proactive, or later phase. All of the 
studies concluded that most firms are in transition between different 
phases with a general trend from reactive toward proactive 
environmental management. 
Post and Altman's (1992) '`Corporate Greening Model" described 
different levels of response to environmental pressures according to 
where a firm is in the continuum of environmental management.  In the 
first phase, "Adjustment", Post and Altman described companies as being 
in a "wait and see" mode where environmental practices are modified on 
an "as-needed" basis. This process is described as one of recognition, 
and not necessarily acceptance of the environmental pressure. Changes 
that take place in this phase, are in response to mounting regulatory 
and/or market pressures. 
This observation is confirmed by Hauth (1990) who found that a 
particular firm had been cited numerous times for permit violations.  In 
one year alone the wastewater quality permit was violated eight times. 
The number of violations dropped to two the year the company was 
acquired by a new owner, and to zero in subsequent years. The change 
in behavior was interpreted as a shift away from a reactive compliance 
mode. 
Post and Altman (1992) contended that most companies in this 
phase have not seriously re-evaluated their environmental goals with 
other management components. Environmental staff in these 
companies, according to their model, remain very technically focused on 
regulatory compliance and are not linked with strategic business goals. 
They suggested the role of corporate leadership is significant in both 17 
triggering the greening process and in stimulating the company to go 
beyond "incremental" adjustments. 
In an early work, Lund (1974) found only 40 percent of companies 
had written environmental policies. This would concur with Post and 
Altman's Corporate Greening Model which concluded these companies, 
newly responding to environmental pressures, were in the reactive phase, 
with nonexistent or newly developing environmental management 
structures. 
In the second phase, of "Adaptive", Post and Altman described 
firms as starting to seriously consider their environmental values and to 
link those values to other parts of the firm. Firms began to go beyond 
strict regulatory compliance to some monitoring of future trends, 
especially as related to the customer base. The final phase of 
"Innovation" involves a rare set of companies where environmental 
management is institutionalized throughout the organization. Post and 
Altman stated that a link between environmental policies, programs and 
staff and all aspects of operations and strategic planning are observed in 
this phase. 
After studying companies over several years, Post and Altman 
(1992) determined that environmental performance improved as 
companies more fully integrated environmental issues into key business 
operations. They found a correlation between high environmental 
performance and firms in the "Innovative" phase. In categorizing many 
companies, they found several in the "Adaptive" phase as also having 
achieved significantly high levels of environmental performance. 18 
However, they consistently found none of the high performers were in the 
"Adjustment", or first phase. 
Chaganti and Phatak (1983) described work by Chandler (1962), 
Scott, Salter and Berg (1970) which confirmed Post and Altman's (1995) 
findings that companies develop through stages. Their reports show that 
organizational structure follows the strategy of the firm and 
organizations tend to move from one stage to another in response to 
pressures such as higher costs and inefficiencies.  Changanti and Phatak 
suggest that the idea of the 'stages" offers a framework for predicting the 
characteristics of a corporation at each stage and the expected pattern of 
evolution, which could be useful to regulators as they begin to question 
what regulatory approaches will yield the most effective outcomes. 
Dillon and Fischer (1992) explained corporate behavior in terms of 
a mix of internal and external factors. Their research yielded some 
positive characteristics between certain internal factors and 
environmental performance. These factors included integration of 
environmental activities with production responsibilities at the facility 
level, facility managers assigned environmental responsibilities, existence 
of a written corporate environmental policy, a long-term environmental 
planning process, and incorporation of environmental factors into 
standard operation procedures. 
A firm's corporate culture has often been overlooked in terms of its 
impact on performance. Yet a firm's culture is its basic "personality" 
(Johnson, 1997). Johnson argued this personality creates the attitudes 
about most of what is important to the firm. He stated that a firm's 
culture is a reflection of its CEO and senior management and believed 19 
that the firm's culture can provide a fairly vivid image of what senior 
management models as its business ethos. Johnson stressed the 
significant impact corporate culture has on attitudes of its members 
which subsequently affects behavior and business results. Dillon and 
Fischer (1992) also found company values affected environmental 
performance, along with strong leadership, financial considerations, 
regulatory requirements, environmental disasters, and concern for 
reputation. 
Power of the Public: Incentive to Change Firm Behavior 
The effect of public scrutiny on the environmental behavior of firms 
has been studied extensively. President Clinton and Vice President Gore 
continually stressed the power of information in their "Reinventing 
Environmental Regulation" report in bringing about significant changes 
in environmental quality (1995). One of their highest priority items was 
to develop a public access program that would make all EPA data and 
publications available electronically and to develop a new center for 
environmental information and statistics to insure data are available to 
the public. Zimmer, U.S. Representative from New Jersey, concurred 
and urged Congress to pass legislation requiring these disclosures. He 
recognized such databases are costly, but maintained that experience 
has shown that unnecessary environmental regulations are more costly 
(Environment Strategy America, 1996). 
Despite the difficulty in quantifying a firm's reputation capital, the 
effects of ignoring the public are measurable and can be enormous. 
Becker and Penny (1996), described a case of the devasting effect of 
negative media coverage on a proposed project for a wastewater utility. 20 
The utility developed serious negative community relations when one of 
its contractors received negative publicity in a nearby town. The incident 
eventually ended in erosion of public support for the project with the 
utility spending hundreds of thousands of dollars trying to restore its 
public image. This study points out not only the crippling effect negative 
media reports can have on a company, but the spillover effect of negative 
publicity. In the case reported by Becker and Penny, the utility was 
found guilty by association, since the contractor was the most visible 
performer in the utility project. The utility was unable to disassociate 
itself from the contractor's bad reputation because of its lack of  vigilance 
in initiating and maintaining responsibility for the project. 
Becker and Penny (1996) maintained that firms engaged in 
environmentally sensitive areas cannot afford to overlook involvement of 
the public early and continuously. Becker and Penny asserted that 
resolving community problems after they have surfaced may cost the 
organization more money and time than preventing them in the first 
place. If left unattended, they argued, the problems can cost the 
organization its reputation. 
Firms with multiple facilities understand this spillover or "additive" 
effect of bad publicity at one facility in changing the reputation of the 
entire company. Such effects can occur regardless of individual 
performance records at each of the facilities. Public perception is often 
based not on individual sites, but on the entire entity. A reported 
"plume" at one facility can mar the overall reputation of all of the firm's 
facilities. Firms then, are faced with the goal of consistent environmental 
records as one facility shifts the "performance bar" for each of the other 
facilities. This phenomenon is seen across firms in the same industrial 21
 
sector. One firm's bad environmental record can affect similar firms in 
the same category, which can create pressure within the industry to 
apply consistent environmental practices. 
The media and interest groups have become very influential in 
changing a company's corporate culture in response to external 
pressures (Greening, 1992). The power of public influence over corporate 
change was one of the hypotheses tested by Greening (1992) in a survey 
of 117 utilities. The survey included a series of questions about the 
extent to which environmental issues were integrated into corporate 
planning. One of the findings was a positive relationship between 
interest group pressure and a firm's integration of environmental issues. 
Greening suggested that whether a company has experienced crisis or 
not will explain the existence of a firm's "issues management structure". 
Post and Altman gave an example of a company that was in the second 
phase of "Adaption" when it began to work more with the community and 
local environmental groups. Greening found that the emergence of 
interest groups represented a significant stage in the life cycle of an issue 
and determined whether the issue will die a quiet death or will be 
catapulted into the public eye. He asserted that "Any view of issues 
management which ignores the power of public interest is naive." 
Mandatory Public Environmental Reporting 
Public pressure has often been cited as one of the strongest 
motivating factors for firms to change their behavior. Economists would 
argue that public pressure is the single biggest factor explaining (publicly 
traded) corporate behavior since markets value companies based on their 
behavior. Cohen and Konar (1995) tested the hypothesis that significant 22
 
stock price reductions resulted from publicly disclosed toxic release 
emissions information required under the Superfund amendments in 
1986. They theorized that a company's disclosure about their 
environmental performance may have significant implications for the 
expected future cash flows of the company. They cited Hamilton (1995) 
as saying publicly traded firms whose toxic release information were 
publicly disclosed experienced statistically significant negative abnormal 
market returns. Hamilton stated that "The implication of this drop in 
stock price is that investors expected there to be increased pressure on 
the firms to spend resources on reducing pollution, thus lowering firm 
profits." 
In addition to collecting Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) from publicly 
traded companies, Cohen and Konar (1995) obtained stock prices and 
two other measures of environmental performance:  oil and chemical 
spills and government-imposed fines for environmental violations. They 
obtained these data to determine if a positive link existed between TRI 
emission reductions and other areas of environmental performance. 
They wanted to test if companies reduced their TRI emissions as a result 
of receiving abnormal returns, and if they also took actions to reduce the 
possibility of other bad environmental news. Even though spills are 
usually accidents, they believed companies can take actions to reduce 
their future likelihood and severity. Thus, they posited that a reduction 
in the number of spills may indicate better environment management 
techniques that may lead to improved environmental performance. 
They recognized that while government-imposed fines are one 
indication of environmental performance, they were also aware penalties 
are discretionary, politically-based, and/or randomly enforced. They also 23 
realized that enforcement trends may reflect changes in government 
enforcement programs. They found that the companies who received the 
most significant negative stock price reactions following the 
announcement of their TRI emissions, significantly lowered their 
emissions. They found that fines increased among the companies, but at 
a much lower rate than their industry peers. 
Operating under the efficient market hypothesis, Cohen and Konar 
anticipated any abnormal movement in stock prices to be the result of 
new information that changes public expectations about the future 
prospects of the company. They emphasized that stock prices are 
affected when the public does not expect the negative reporting from a 
company. If a company was expected to be the highest polluter and was 
subsequently reported as such, they found little or no change in stock 
valuation because market valuation would already reflect market 
expectations. 
In later work, Cohen and Konar (1995) showed that mandatory 
public disclosure can have a significant effect on market valuation, which 
is likely to induce the company to reduce emissions and to otherwise 
improve its environmental performance. Thus, in some situations, 
providing public disclosure may be an effective regulatory approach to 
reducing pollution beyond what is required under a regulation. 
The recent interest in the use of information as a quasi-regulatory 
mechanism follows regulatory approaches such as Toxic Release 
Inventory, securities regulations requiring disclosure of certain 
environmental liabilities, and European government-sponsored "green 
labels" that provides information to interested public in an attempt to 24
 
affect company behavior indirectly through consumer, public or 
community pressure. (Cohen and Konar, 1995). Mandatory disclosure 
requirements might be viewed as a market-based incentive for companies 
to change their behavior. Public disclosure of a company's emissions 
may affect consumer purchase decisions. 
Publicizing the names of polluters has been found to be one of the 
most effective regulatory strategies. In some cases up to 35 percent 
reductions in emissions have occurred from such public disclosure. 
(Business Week, May 31, 1993). In the Business Week article, industry 
officials were quoted as saying, "Companies just want to get off the lists 
of top polluters." Others said, "We knew the numbers were high, and we 
knew the public wasn't going to like it." To fend off an outcry, Monsanto 
was reported as slashing its worldwide toxic air pollutants by 90 percent 
and has since spent $120 million on 250 projects (Business Week, May 
31, 1993). The article was quoted as saying, "When it comes to cutting 
pollution, generating goodwill and avoiding negative publicity can be 
powerful motivators." 
Other studies (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975, and Baram, Dillon and 
Ruffle, 1992) also determined that mandatory public disclosure is a 
powerful tool for changing public perception and for initiating 
organizational changes. Their findings showed that companies required 
to publicly disclose releases place a higher value on risks of certain 
products and production processes. These companies, according to 
Baram et al (1992), realized their "externalities" were more visible under 
the regulatory requirement to publicly disclose their emission levels, and 
were more likely to stimulate public reaction. One study revealed that 
over 60 percent of a survey of 220 executives at large multinational 25
 
companies admitted that one of the primary factors driving their 
environmental policy is the threat of adverse publicity or lawsuits 
(Cohen, 1997). 
Other research found that the level of pollution varies among firms 
because of firm-specific factors that affect both the ability and incentive 
for pollution reduction. Company size was one firm-specific factor cited. 
Ability to reduce emissions was linked to financial resources and 
incentive to reduce was cited as sensitivity to public scrutiny (Cohen and 
Konar, 1995). Cohen and Konar (1995) found that the largest firms are 
most likely to reduce emissions subsequent to public disclosure of their 
emissions inventory. This is because larger firms have more reputation 
capital to lose in the event of bad environmental publicity. Larger firms 
are subject to more public scrutiny and have more at stake when 
considering the effect of negative publicity. A large company wanting to 
expand into different locations may find their environmental reputation 
affects their ability to get favorable zoning and tax treatment. 
Among the more important findings of the effect of public scrutiny 
on a firm's environmental performance is the impact depends upon the 
extent to which a firm's environmental reputation matters and 
stakeholder pressures are important. Firms with the most to lose from a 
negative environmental reputation have a greater incentive to improve 
their environmental performance (Cohen and Konar, 1995). 
Voluntary Public Environmental Reporting 
Corporate social responsibility reporting are disclosures provided 
either in annual reports, or other media that summarize socially 26
 
responsible activities of a firm. The short answer to why companies 
provide disclosures is public pressure  real or perceived (Simmons and 
Neu, 1996). In their study, Simmons and Neu found that continued 
media coverage of corporate activities related to environmentally-
sensitive issues has increased the visibility of corporate activities. This, 
they posited, has increased the public pressure brought to bear by 
concerned stakeholders against various firms. Social disclosures in 
annual reports, they contended, are one way of managing the demands 
and concerns of stakeholders. Annual reports allow organizations to 
"balance" the negative media coverage. 
Another function of social disclosures (Neu, Warsame and Pedwell, 
1996) is to hide poor social or economic performance. Disclosures are 
cited as a cost-effective way to respond to stakeholder concerns regarding. 
corporate activities (Simmons and Neu, 1996). The annual report is a 
primary information source for investors, creditors, employees, and 
environmental groups. Organizational managers view stockholders, and 
environmental advocacy groups as well as employees and the community 
as the primary audiences for social responsibility disclosures (Neu, 
Warsame and Pedwell, 1996). While there are different types of corporate 
social responsibility disclosures which include health and safety 
practices, hiring practices, and community activities, this discussion 
focuses on disclosures of an organization's environmental activities. 
More than 150 companies now voluntarily disclose reports on their 
environmental performance (Nestel and Fava, 1997). A staggering 
amount of time, energy and money are invested in environmental 
disclosures  over $5 billion a year. Today's average 32-page annual 
report containing environmental reporting costs in excess of $500,000 to 27
 
produce, or as much as $8 a copy (Neu, Warsame and Pedwell, 1996). 
By these statistics alone, it is apparent how important environmental 
disclosures are to many companies in shaping and changing public 
opinion of their environmental practices. Epstein and Freedman (1994) 
reported that 82 percent of the investors they surveyed wanted to see 
environmental disclosures included in the annual report, with a majority 
saying that environmental stewardship was more important than 
increased dividends. They suggested recent regulatory changes 
surrounding enforcement and increased civil and criminal penalties for 
environmental violations was responsible for stakeholders' interest in 
what was seen as a growing liability. Previous studies have shown that 
organizational managers often simultaneously release qualitative "good 
news" with quantitative "bad news" in an attempt to offset the impact of 
negative financial numbers (Neu et al. 1996). 
Progressive companies were found to be more likely than their 
predecessors to provide disclosures in response to public pressure 
(Guthrie and Parker, 1989). As mentioned earlier, Cohen and Konar 
(1995) determined that company size was a useful barometer for the 
influence of public pressure for firms subject to mandatory corporate 
disclosure. Likewise, this appears to be an important factor in 
determining who will voluntarily disclose, along with industry grouping 
(Patten, 1991) which confirms what might be expected  that large 
companies operating in environmentally sensitive sectors are more likely 
to provide environmental disclosures because of their susceptibility to 
public scrutiny. 
Greening (1992) speculated that whether a company had 
experienced a crisis would explain what he referred to as the company's 28
 
"issues management structure." One of the ways organizations respond 
to external pressures is through corporate disclosures, which would be 
an element of Greening's "issues management structure".  Simmons and 
Neu (1996) sought to determine if there was an association between 
events which are believed to challenge corporate behavior and 
disclosures in the company's annual report. They assumed that a 
positive relationship implied that managers may be using environmental 
disclosures as a way of forestalling challenges by regulators and other 
interest groups. 
They also gathered profitability information to demonstrate that if 
there was a negative association between firm profitability and inclusion 
of environmental disclosures, they would interpret this as an attempt to 
divert attention from negative financial results. They found that firms 
subject to environmental fines during the year studied, were more likely 
to include environmental disclosures in the year-end annual report. In 
74 percent of the cases where firms were subject to environmental fines, 
they reported management decided to include environmental disclosures 
compared to 44 percent of the time when environmental fines were 
absent. They reported the probability of observing this outcome by 
chance is less than 1 percent (Simmons and Neu, 1996). They reported 
little association between firms reporting losses and the presence of 
environmental information in the annual report. From their work, it 
appears that environmental fines may motivate managers to include 
environmental disclosures in the annual report as a way of responding to 
the stigma associated with the fine; whereas negative financial 
performance did not motivate managers to include environmental 
information in the annual report. 29 
One of the main purposes of public disclosures is they allow 
companies to manage their external environment.  Disclosures give 
companies an opportunity to shape public perception. Dowling and 
Pfeffer (1975) speculated that a company's image can be managed more 
easily through communication than changing its outputs, goals or 
methods of operations. At the same time a company is attempting to 
develop a public image through voluntary reporting of its environmental 
practices, public perception may "feed back" changes to its corporate 
culture depending on how closely the disclosure mirrors societal values 
about the environment which means, the influence of the public on a 
firm's environmental practices is not just confined to mandatory 
disclosures. 
The extent to which a firm can shape public perception is one way 
of legitimizing a firm. As an example, Oliver (1991) illustrated 
legitimization of an organization's compliance with environmental 
regulations. He stated this elevates a firm's legitimacy and can protect it 
from public criticism. It is assumed that because firms depend on 
continued support of stakeholders, they will attempt to communicate 
legitimizing characteristics to this audience. It is inevitable that firms 
will have competing stakeholder interests to balance. Financial 
stakeholders and environmentalists often have different expectations of 
organizational behavior. Oliver (1991) commented that, when there are 
competing stakeholder interests, organizations often choose to defy or 
dismiss the demands of one group in order to meet the demand of more 
important groups. From this perspective, it makes sense for firms to 
overlook the demands of environmentalists since they are the least 
influential of the constituents. Oliver also proposed that "low effort" 
symbolic gestures (e.g. "good neighbor policies") aimed at demonstrating 30 
minimal appeasement are another alternative to outright defiance of 
such groups. 
Oliver (1991) found that when an organization's performance and 
survival are only moderately dependent on public opinion (e.g. arms 
manufacturer) avoidance tactics such as superficial gestures of 
compliance and restricted access to information on the company's 
practices (concealment) may be the extent of an organization's 
responsiveness (1991). Marx (1993) commented that: Reports are 
directed at those constituencies which can be expected to identify most 
closely with the company rather than at the company's critics. The 
purpose of these reports is to solidify support, not to proselytize. As this 
statement implies, environmental disclosures are directed at important 
and supportive constituents, not at critical constituents. 
Oliver's finding that companies direct their attention to the most 
influential public group was confirmed by an empirical study conducted 
by Neu et al. (1996). Among the more important findings, the following 
was determined: 
1.	  There were increased levels of environmental disclosures during 
unprofitable years to address concerns of shareholders; 
2.	  Concern of creditors did not have an appreciable influence on 
levels of environmental disclosure; 
3.	  Criticisms from regulators and environmentalists were also 
associated with the level of environmental disclosure although 
in opposing directions. 31
 
These findings showed that concerns of shareholders were the 
primary influence on the level of environmental disclosure. 
The amount of media coverage given to environmental fines during 
a particular year was associated with increased levels of environmental 
disclosure. However, the amount of media coverage of environmental 
criticism during a particular year was associated with decreased levels of 
environmental disclosure. 
Legitimacy and how companies use environmental disclosures to 
frame how financial stakeholders interpret financial information was 
studied by Neu, Warsame and Pedwell (1996). In their study, it was 
stated that publicly disclosed environmental reporting tends to have an 
aura of legitimacy as the public has come to place a certain value on this 
kind of reporting, and because the public cannot observe most of the 
firm's functions. The study stated that the public comes to rely on 
annual reports, financial statements and other public disclosures as 
imperfect proxies for these activities. This study determined this is 
especially true for quantitative data. The study noted, however, that 
organizational legitimacy is precarious since contradictions invariably 
exist between the firm's activities used to generate profits and social 
values. It points out how the emergence of well-organized and vocal 
groups such as Greenpeace, Earthfirst!, and others have called attention 
to this incongruency. Consequently, the study surmised the intersection 
of fractionalized social values, well organized and vocal interest groups 
and the necessity for firms to operate in a competitive global economy 
has made organizational legitimacy increasingly important, yet more 
difficult to attain. Accounting researchers have suggested that corporate 32
 
social responsibility disclosures may help to resolve some of the 
problems of organizational legitimacy. 
Another finding was that companies using voluntary public 
disclosures to change public perception may deflect attention away from 
real environmental problems either by not including these issues in the 
disclosure, or by highlighting the company's positive environmental 
accomplishments with an attempt to echo well known social 
environmental values (Neu et al. 1996). 
Most voluntary disclosures are highly selective in their content. 
Much of the reporting takes on a public relations focus where new 
business opportunities and markets driven by environmental 
requirements are offered. What is offered in these disclosures, or more 
accurately, the absence of hard environmental analysis, has come under 
increasing attack with critics calling these reports "greenwashing". These 
corporate environmental reports typically lack analysis and complete 
information on how corporate activities actually affect the environment 
(Environmental Manager's Compliance Advisor, 1997). Lober (1995) used 
the Toxic Release Inventory as an example of selective reporting, where 
he noted that half the corporate environmental reports contained each 
company's TRI, but only 19 percent reported the volumes of their 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Price Waterhouse (1990, 1992) found that 62 percent of companies 
surveyed were aware of environmental liabilities that were not yet 
recorded in their financial statements (Nestel and Fava, 1997). This 
meant that millions of dollars of potential remediation or environmental 
costs were not yet reflected in reported earnings which has resulted in 33 
increased scrutiny of environmental reporting for financial purposes, by 
the Securities Exchange Commission (Nestel and Fava, 1997). 
While some researchers argue voluntary disclosures about a firm's 
environmental performance are misrepresentative (Wiseman, 1982), 
others contend public disclosures are only partial representations of a 
company's environmental performance since companies selectively 
choose what is disclosed. Neu et al (1996) stated that public disclosures 
are meant to manage public perception, but not necessarily by providing 
false information. 
While the debate about the value or accuracy of what is contained 
in environmental disclosures continues, there appears to be some 
changes in standardizing public disclosures of environmental 
performance. The Public Environmental Reporting Initiative (PERI) was 
founded in 1993 by a small group of sponsors, including Dow Chemical, 
Du Point, IBM, Allied Signal, AT&T and Union Carbide. This type of effort 
appears to be rapidly gaining acceptance (Nestel and Fava,  1997). The 
PERI group has adopted public reporting and disclosure standards that 
include financial information and quantitative metrics for air emissions, 
wastewater discharges and solid/hazardous waste generation. The 
group also reports quantity usage and emission trends for some of the 
more highly visible performance indicators such as TRI, 
chlorofluorocarbons, other ozone depleting chemicals and carcinogens. 
Sun Company and General Motors also adopted the Coalition for 
Environmental Responsible Economics' codes (CERES) for environmental 
management and reporting. This resulted from an investor-led group 
that promoted the controversial Valdez Principles following the Valdez 34
 
spill. The Valdez Principles were universally boycotted by industry 
claiming invasion of company privacy. (Nestel and Fava, 1997). 
ISO 14000 (International Organization for Standardization) is 
another management system/life cycle/product stewardship system that 
is gaining acceptance. The widely adopted ISO 9000 (quality 
management standards) is believed to continue its expansion due to 
increased spending on pollution control and the potential impacts this 
may have on markets and pricing (Nestel and Fava, 1997). 
Eco-Management and Audit Regulation (EMAS) is another 
reporting standardization system described as driving developments in 
the area of reporting, with companies making efforts to bring their 
reporting in line with EMAS requirements (Nestel and Fava, 1997). 
Among other actions, EMAS requires the company's environmental 
statement to be verified by an accredited third party. More and more 
European companies are now having their reports verified, but third 
party verification has not been embraced by their U.S. counterparts 
despite the clear credibility gains with stakeholders (Elkington and 
Spencer-Cooke, 1996). Fearful about liability implications, some U.S. 
companies have tried to rein in the environmental auditing activities of 
their European subsidiaries, or parent companies. But, according to 
Elkington and Spencer-Cooke (1996), and Nestel and Fava (1997), the 
trend is toward increasing levels of disclosure. While some caution about 
predicting whether PERI, CERES, ISO or some combination of systems 
will become industry standards, a number of researchers noted that 
many companies can be expected to follow the trend toward more 
rigorous reporting on key environmental performance indicators. 35 
Some researchers have examined why some firms voluntarily go 
beyond compliance. As is the case with voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure, the public appears to be one of the principle reasons. For 
example, EPA's 33/50 program has adopted goals of voluntary 
reductions of certain chemicals (33 percent by a certain date; 50 percent 
by a later date) (Arora, 1993). Arora showed that many companies 
overcomply with the requirements, purportedly induced by consumer 
preferences for environmental quality. Consumers were found to value 
environmental quality. Firm's management strategy to meet these 
demands are two-stage where companies first chose a level of clean-up 
and then engaged in price competition. 
Cohen and Konar (1995) also found that consumers' demand for 
less damaging products and expectations for less polluting processes, are 
two reasons for firms' over-compliance. This study stated that 
companies will voluntarily go beyond legally mandated regulatory 
requirement if in their best interest. They reported that companies tend 
to not pursue environmental strategies until confident of a payoff. 
Whether through mandatory or voluntary actions, the literature 
provides consistent evidence that the public provides a strong incentive 
for companies to change their environmental behavior, and in some 
cases, public disclosure may serve as a viable regulatory tool for 
accomplishing environmental goals. 
Barriers to Perform: Financial Considerations 
The effect of public scrutiny on a company's environmental 
performance is entangled with financial considerations. In theory, each 36 
company must weigh the costs of public disclosure of  "negative 
environmental publicity" against the costs of taking actions to put the 
company in a more favorable light. Public perception can ultimately 
affect a firm's profit maximizing potential. While public pressures can 
create incentives for firms to change their behavior, financial 
considerations are often cited as the biggest barrier to environmental 
performance. Seventy five percent of those who disclosed Toxic Release 
Inventory data reported that availability of capital for process changes 
was very important in influencing their selection of equipment or 
operations (Roy and Jehassi, 1997). Another study on pollution 
prevention cited among the most commonly mentioned barriers to 
pollution prevention were the necessary investment of time, money and 
staffing (US EPA, 1996.) 
Environmental regulations can affect a firm's financial resources 
through equipment and operational decisions. Costs related to meeting 
regulatory requirements include compliance costs for certain equipment 
and operations, production efficiency of equipment, and raw materials. 
The pulp and paper industry presently spends approximately 20 
percent of their earnings on environmental laws and regulations. This is 
in addition to $15 billion the industry has self-reportedly spent over the 
past decade on facilities to satisfy public demands for more paper 
recycling (Moore, 1996). Complying with environmental regulations is 
costly and may affect a firm's profitability. On the other hand, a firm 
that is efficient at pollution control might also be efficient at production. 
Moreover, a firm that does well financially can afford to spend more of its 
resources on cleaner technologies (Cohen, Fenn and Naimon, 1995). 37 
According to Cohen and Konar (1995), a firm's financial ability 
plays an important role in determining emission levels. Firms with 
constrained cash flows are least likely to reduce emissions. They found 
that companies with tight financial situations had environmental 
performance that worsened relative to their industry peers. They also 
determined that firms with higher cash flows tended to be lower "baseline 
emitters" (emission levels prior to public disclosure) of toxic chemicals. 
Nestel and Fava (1997) reported that for many companies, environmental 
expenditures such as capital spending have become financially 
significant and can no longer be viewed merely as a "cost of doing 
business." They concurred with Cohen and Konar (1995) by stating that 
investors have become increasingly concerned about these major 
environmental expenditures in addition to the liabilities associated with 
these burdens. 
While the effect of increasing environmental costs on a firm's 
financial health is generally undisputed, researchers are pointing out 
that some firms are using increasing environmental costs as a 
competitive advantage, especially as more firms shift from end-of-pipe as 
the primary method of pollution control, to pollution prevention (Cohen, 
Fenn and Naimon, 1995). Hauth (1990) found that more manufacturers 
are trying to minimize the waste they produce because of regulatory, 
economic and community concerns. In trying to minimize or prevent 
pollution, he argued these firms are substituting hazardous materials 
with less toxic substances, modifying or upgrading their plant systems to 
"design out" pollution and are changing operation and maintenance 
through revised procedures, training, inventory control and better 
housekeeping. 38
 
The notion that corporate environmental performance may be 
linked with financial performance has attracted limited academic 
research. However, Cohen et al. (1995) discovered many companies are 
convinced of the link, and viewed environmental costs as opportunities to 
outperform competitors. Schmidheiny commented "When viewed within 
the context of sustainable development, environmental concerns become 
not just a cost of doing business, but a potent source of competitive 
advantage. Enterprises that embrace the concept can effectively realize 
the advantages: more efficient processes, improvements in productivity, 
lower costs of compliance, and new strategic market opportunities. Such 
businesses may expect to reap advantages over their competitors who 
lack vision. Companies that fail to change can expect to become obsolete 
(Cohen, Fenn and Naimon, 1995)." 
Several other authors have reported this competitive advantage 
and long term survivability resulting from companies integrating 
environmental issues. Woodhouse stated "The degree to which a 
company is viewed as being a positive or negative participant in solving 
sustainability issues will determine, to a very great degree, their long-
term business viability." Mahoney said "Monsanto's ability to develop 
new products, enter new markets, sell our current products and operate 
our manufacturing facilities profitably depends upon continuous 
improvement in environmental performance." Druckman was quoted as 
saying "Continuous improvement of environmental management 
throughout the organization is a key factor for our competitiveness in the 
1990's. Each business group and division now incorporates strategies to 
address environmental management issues in its strategic plan" (Cohen, 
Fenn and Naimon, 1995). 39 
Other studies support the argument that business opportunities 
grow out of environmental costs. After months of debate over NAFTA 
Lichtinger (1996), is quoted as saying many companies overlooked the 
possibility that environmental protection could not only lead to an 
improved environment, but also creates business opportunities through 
innovation and sharing of technology across borders. 
It is generally undisputed that financial resources are significant in 
determining a company's ability to comply with environmental 
regulations and can be a barrier to improved performance. However, 
recent research showed that progressive companies have moved beyond 
the traditional view that increasing environmental costs are no more 
than part of the costs associated with the firm's activities. Rather, these 
companies are using environmental costs as a means for producing 
greater efficiencies for competitive advantage. 
Effect of Market Based Regulations on Innovation and 
Pollution Control Costs 
The literature is dominated by proponents of market-based 
regulatory approaches. A growing majority from President Clinton and Al 
Gore's State of the Union address on reinventing environmental 
regulation (1995) to industry analysts, believe radical changes in the 
environmental system will result in dramatic improvements in firm 
profitability, ability to innovate and environmental compliance. 
Operational flexibility is on everyone's agenda. 
Roy and Jehassi (1997) surveyed over 1000 respondents on 
industry motivation for pollution prevention. Their work noted that while 
traditional environmental regulatory programs were almost unrivaled in 40
 
bringing the attention of business decision makers to their 
environmental obligations, there may be room to improve regulatory 
effectiveness in facilitating companies in meeting those obligations. They 
also commented that traditional regulatory programs that establish 
limits on what can be released into the environment, are argued to be 
both motivators and inhibitors of pollution prevention. End-of-pipe 
approaches under a traditional approach were described as inhibiting 
pollution prevention since it focused on technology requirements, 
whereas some companies were motivated to find cost-effective ways, such 
as pollution prevention, to comply with traditional regulatory 
approaches. 
Other studies confirm the benefits of a market-based system. The 
Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers who 
examine public issues that affect the economy. In one of their studies 
(1993) they evaluated several "best in class" facilities made up of large 
corporations to determine what it was that made these facilities 
successful in developing an environmental hierarchy. Of the common 
elements found among these firms, flexibility to choose regulatory tools 
was cited. These firms responded that flexible regulatory tools was 
critical to adapt environmental strategies to the facilities' culture and 
needs, as opposed to regulators telling them how to prevent pollution. 
Another finding was that facilities spent more on compliance in response 
to government regulations, than on pollution prevention (1993). 
Pollution prevention is one market-based regulatory approach, 
whose success has recently been tracked among several statewide 
programs. One study of Central Massachusetts' Pollution Prevention 
proram yielded 87 percent of the firms receiving on-site technical 41
 
assistance or attending workshops reported toxics use reductions 
compared with 39 percent of similar firms in the same region. (US EPA, 
1996). Another study reported significant pollution prevention where 
firms changed processes or materials, came into compliance, saved 
significant amounts of money, eliminated sizeable pollution or 
established an on-going program. This study reported environmental 
benefits to the Merrimack River Watershed and cost savings for industry. 
1.7 million pounds of toxic wastes eliminated, and over $1.9 billion saved 
by industry (US EPA, 1996). Clearly there are benefits related to market-
based approaches. 
Innovation has long been thought to be linked to regulatory 
approach. This is confirmed by Magat (1979) and Bhatnagar and Cohen 
(1997). Both of these studies found that the incentive to innovate is 
stronger under market based systems than under command and control 
regulations. Bhatnagar and Cohen (1997) found that virtually all 
theoretical models linking environmental regulations to innovation were 
found to be market-based approaches. They asserted that properly 
designed environmental regulations can trigger innovations that can 
partially or fully offset the cost of compliance (Bhatnagar and Cohen, 
1997) They stated that: "Unless innovation is needed for technological 
reasons to meet a regulatory standard that is otherwise unachievable, 
innovation is also likely to reduce the cost burden associated with 
meeting more stringent regulations." Their study examined whether 
stricter regulations, as measured by higher pollution control costs and 
stricter monitoring and enforcement actions stimulate environmental 
innovation. Their research covered 146 U.S. manufacturing companies 
from 1983 to 1992 and showed that more stringent environmental 
regulations stimulated innovation in environmental protection (as 42
 
measured by the number of environmentally-related patent applications); 
however, they found there was no evidence that these environmental 
patents increased industry profits. 
Lichtinger (1996) made a case for wider and more effective use of 
market incentives in environmental regulations :  "Those who believe that 
markets work better than bureaucracies should fully support the use of 
environmental policy instruments that build the cost of environmental 
degradation. Doing so, instead of relying predominately on command 
and control regulatory approaches, raises productivity." The report cites 
three ways in which market-based approaches would succeed over more 
traditional policy approaches: 
1) Firms can adopt the environmental controls that are cost-
effective rather than following the prescribed technological 
solutions imbedded in regulations; 
2) The costs of environmental controls can be redistributed among 
firms in ways that induce those who can clean up relatively 
inexpensively to do more; and 
3) The profit motive can be enlisted more forcefully to develop new 
and better methods to deal with environmental problems since 
in a market economy one firm's costs is another firm's 
opportunities. 
Zimmer (U.S. Representative from New Jersey, 12th district) 
attempted to have Congress advocate for more cost-effective regulatory 43 
approaches. In particular, he is promoting the enactment of a single 
comprehensive act that enables EPA to address multi-media pollution in 
the most cost-effective manner (Environment Strategy America, 1996). 
He concluded that command and control should be the last regulatory 
option exercised with the primary goal being an overall reduction of risk 
instead of an arbitrarily defined reduction of risk from a particular 
process or substance. He argued that Congress needs to harness market 
forces to encourage conservation of resources and pollution prevention. 
Regulators have recognized the difficulty and challenge in 
regulating area or "nonpoint sources". Environmental agencies are just 
beginning to shift their emphasis away from large industrial sources to 
smaller area sources. Applying the command and control approach is 
particularly problematic for hundreds of smaller, more diffuse sources. 
Financial resources are even more of a concern with this group, thus the 
traditional compliance assurance under the command and control 
approach, are either prohibitive or are administratively unmanageable for 
the agency. A centralized regulatory approach such as command and 
control was viewed as unworkable in agricultural settings because such 
approaches deny farmers the flexibility to choose among the full range of 
pollution control options while responding to changing economic, 
environmental or technological conditions (Congdon, 1996). Clearly this 
argument applies to a wide range of area sources and other industrial 
point sources as described above. Command and control approaches 
were found to necessitate a high level of administrative involvement by 
regulators. Even when the pollution control goal is met, there are 
significant shortcomings in using such approaches with nonpoint 
sources. 44 
Researchers argued that a successful regulatory approach must 
respond to widespread concerns over the costs of regulation. In many 
situations, tradeable discharge permits, effluent fees, surcharges on 
inputs, or other incentive-based programs can satisfy requirements for 
accountability, flexibility and cost-effectiveness and still achieve an 
environmental goal (Congdon, 1996.) 
Vig and Kraft (1990) stated three reasons that economic analysis 
and market initiatives are increasingly useful in dealing with the 
environmental problems of the 1990's. First, they argued that regulators 
are finding that solutions are more and more costly as they address more 
complex and deeply rooted national and global environmental problems; 
Thus, it is increasingly important that the public gets its "money's worth" 
from these policies. Second, they argued that the slow progress made 
over the past twenty years in air and water pollution problems 
necessitated the need to use private initiatives more effectively through 
altering the incentive structure. They believed this meant relying more 
on pollution charges, tradeable discharge permits, and deposit-refund 
systems. Finally, they cited that the high aggregate cost of controlling 
pollutants and environmental threats makes designing policies that are 
cost-effective more imperative. 
Bhatnagar and Cohen examined the possibility of company 
innovation in the absence of government regulations. In accordance with 
Van der Linde (1993), they found that government standards are 
required for three reasons. First, since companies are likely to receive 
indirect benefits that completely offset the costs of compliance in only a 
limited number of cases, the government must push firms to innovate. 
Second, government-backed standards serve as signals to industry that 45 
environmental issues will take on a greater significance in the future. 
Finally, standards create the necessary pressure to prod firms into 
initiating changes. 
However, many companies prefer voluntary efforts to legal 
mandates to provide the latitude to spend their pollution control 
resources more effectively. Companies such as 3M, Dow Chemical and 
American Telephone and Telegraph have found that many investments in 
pollution prevention pay for themselves in reduced costs (Business Week, 
May 31, 1993). Others involved in voluntary programs such as EPA's 
Project XL, find cost savings or economic opportunities, and/or reduced 
paperwork burdens when allowed to choose the compliance method to 
achieve environmental standards. Incentive-based mechanisms can play 
an important role in achieving pollution control targets in a more cost-
efficient manner. 
Opposition to incorporating market-based strategies in the mix of 
regulatory choices is difficult to find, at least from an industrial point of 
view. Some would argue all regulatory approaches should use a market 
approach since this approach reportedly will lead to additional benefits 
at lesser costs. The purported effects of a system based in part on 
market-based approaches are nothing short of radical improvements to 
the emissions level impasse experienced under the current regulatory 
regime. While much of the literature has an industry-perspective, it 
should be noted that environmental groups often express a different view 
of growing skepticism of relaxed regulatory requirements. 
These interest groups worry that market-based approaches 
primarily represent benefits to firms in the form of operational flexibility, 46 
less reporting requirements and not as much oversight. They voice 
concerns about undoing the important environmental gains brought 
about by the draconian system criticized by industry. More progressive 
environmental interest groups will rationalize improvements most 
certainly need to be made in the existing system dominated by a 
command and control approach, and in some specific cases, under 
regulatory oversight, additional gains may be realized using select 
market-based tools. However, they caution against dismantling what 
has heretofore been a relatively predictable system of environmental 
control. 47 
Literature Summary
 
Organizational models can be used to describe firms as moving 
along a continuum, with respect to environmental performance. These 
models describe organizations as integrating environmental issues over 
time. Several studies indicated a link between certain characteristics 
found among firms at various stages and their environmental 
performance. The characteristics described in later stages included 
existence of a written corporate environmental policy, long term 
environmental planning, links between environmental issues and 
production, and the extent to which environmental issues permeated 
decision making in key business functions. 
The literature consistently showed the further firms were in terms 
of integrating environmental issues into strategic business areas, the 
better their environmental performance. Research indicated virtually all 
the high performers were consistently found in the latter stages. This 
information can be useful to regulators in that tools can be designed to 
more closely match a company's position according to organizational 
models. In other words, a firm still in the beginning stages may respond 
more favorably to technical assistance than a firm in the more proactive 
or "innovative" stage. 
Several factors were cited in the literature as being responsible for 
moving firms along this progression, including exposure to "crises", and 
other internal factors such as corporate culture that reflected 
management's commitment to environmental issues; however, the most 
significant factor cited to stimulate environmental progression in 48
 
organizations was the pressure of public interest groups, which can be 
linked, in some cases, to environmental crisis. 
Mandatory public disclosure of toxic emissions can affect a firm's 
stock values. An interesting finding was that markets responded to 
publicly disclosed information that was unexpected. In other words, the 
market reacted when they did not expect a particular firm to be a high 
polluter. It did not have similar reactions to other disclosures when a 
firm was expected to be a high polluter. This may suggest that this 
strategy works only when the information is new to the market, and the 
market has not already accounted for such information in their valuation 
of such firms. 
Markets apply a significant pressure to promote organizational 
change. Use of information as quasi-regulatory tools has not been used 
since the Superfund amendments in the late 1980s; possibly because of 
increased political pressures on environmental agencies. However, 
regulators can still incorporate publicly disclosed environmental 
information in their mix of regulatory choices, perhaps through the use 
of public interest groups, or other third parties, or perhaps as part of 
enforcement actions. Regulators may also want to use this information 
as a strategy for firms with environmental reputations not yet factored 
into public perception. 
A distinction must be made between publicly disclosed 
environmental information that is mandatory  and part of a regulatory 
requirement, and voluntary disclosures. The driving factors that prompt 
disclosures are obviously different between the two, and the ensuing 49
 
effects on the organization and, possibly the market can be quite 
different. 
Voluntary disclosures were also found to affect market perceptions, 
and markets came to rely on such disclosures as "credible" 
representations of the firm's activities. However, the firm can control the 
content and presentation of voluntary disclosures. It appears that often 
accountants view their responsibility as reviewing only the financial 
portions of such disclosures which does not include auditing the 
environmental information. Some researchers suggested that this fact 
casts doubt on the accuracy of environmental information in publicly 
disclosed corporate reports, particularly since companies often position 
environmental information close to financial information to increase 
credibility. 
Several researchers questioned the credibility of environmental 
data in corporate reports, stating that the majority lacked analysis of 
anything related to environmental activities. A more sinister view was 
the finding that some firms actually failed to disclose significant 
environmental liabilities in their reported earnings. Such practices are 
being followed more closely by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
and are being addressed by increased use of reporting standards. 
Despite these concerns, voluntary disclosures are powerful tools 
used by firms as strategic tools to frame the corporate image in the hopes 
of changing public perception. They can conceivably be used to 
complement or even offset negative impacts of mandatory disclosures, 
and may be used to balance negative media treatment.  To the extent a 50
 
firm can effectively "mirror" societal values, this may be one of the most 
cost-effective tools for controlling market perceptions. 
Financial considerations were stated as being both an inhibitor of 
environmental performance, in terms of increased costs, and a motivator, 
with respect to stimulating innovation and competitive advantages. 
Financial issues were described as being entangled with the effect of 
public scrutiny on a firm, as firms will ostensibly weigh the costs of 
changing negative public perception with the costs associated with 
remedying the environmental practice that led to the negative perception. 
One study suggested it is easier to manage public perception through 
communication than by operational changes. 
Environmental costs appear to reach into nearly every functioning 
part of an organization, from equipment choices to operational practices. 
A link appears to exist between a firm's financial performance and its 
environmental performance that goes beyond the obvious connection 
based on resource availability. This link is described in terms of markets 
viewing a firm's environmental record as bearing on its profitability. A 
firm that is efficient in its pollution control is typically judged as being 
efficient at production. The significant market drop observed after firms 
publicly disclosed their toxic emissions was concluded to be due to 
investors expecting an increased pressure to spend resources on 
reducing pollution, thus lowering the firm's profits. 
Market-based advocates have the strong opinion that regulations 
that follow this approach will result in innovation, cost savings both to 
the firm and regulatory agency, and improved environmental compliance. 
This view was tempered with concerns from an environmental 51
 
perspective which notes that the traditional command and control 
approach, cumbersome though it is, has achieved significant 
environmental gains to date. One of the primary concerns has to do with 
disrupting this record of accomplishment. 
Despite the debate about market-based approaches, it is apparent 
that firms vary in their response to different regulatory initiatives. Some 
industries respond favorably to technical assistance, others find it of 
little value. Some firms might find toxic use planning requirements 
valuable in identifying pollution prevention options, others find them 
hollow paperwork exercises. 
The research attempts to test a number of the arguments 
developed in the literature. The principal paradigm examined was the 
contention that the development of effective regulations must incorporate 
the factors known to stimulate corporate growth in environmental 
management. Such growth in management can only occur if regulators 
have an adequate understanding of organizational behavior in order to 
design regulatory initiatives that can overcome the present condition of 
diminishing environmental returns. 
This growth in environmental management appears to be driven by 
an array of factors. In this research, it was attempted to determine 
whether incentives and barriers lead to improved environmental 
performance as manifested in the area of air pollution control. The 
relative importance of various factors identified in the literature was 
determined through surveying large industrial sources of air pollution 
and through interviews of environmental agency staff. Factors examined 
included such elements as management's commitment to environmental 52 
directives, training on such directives, comprehensibility of 
environmental regulations, linkage of compensation to environmental 
performance, and relationship between the sources and the 
environmental agency. Integration of corporate policy was examined by 
testing the consistency of responses from personnel at various staffing 
levels at the companies. 53
 
Methodology 
Introduction 
Environmental performance is clearly described as being driven by 
an array of factors. This research attempts to test that assertion by 
surveying two large industrial sources of air pollution, and personnel at a 
state environmental agency. The focus of the research is to determine 
the relative importance of factors expressed in the literature related to 
incentives and barriers to environmental performance. In addition, the 
survey will attempt to determine the extent to which other factors, such 
as management commitment to environmental directives, training on 
such directives and environmental regulations, the comprehensibility of 
environmental regulations, linkage of compensation to environmental 
performance, and the relationship with the environmental agency 
significantly affects a company's environmental behavior. 
Information related to environmental performance was collected in 
two ways: 
telephone and in-person interviews of two major industrial sources of 
air pollution; and 
telephone and in-person informal interviews with city, state and 
federal environmental agency staff, consultants, academe, and 
industry. 54
 
Survey 
Two large industrial sources of air pollution in the forest products 
industry were chosen to survey as part of this research. The surveys 
were conducted during May and June, 1997. These firms were chosen 
for three reasons:  1) the forest products industry is a key player in the 
Pacific Northwest's economy; 2) the forest products industry has faced 
continued environmental crises, particularly over the past decade; and 
3) these firms, in particular, have been in business for many years. 
The forest products industry has been a key player in regional 
economics for decades. Yet, it has been in turmoil for a decade. This 
industry struggled through recession in the early 1980s. In Washington 
state, over 70,000 people worked in the forest products industry and 
produced approximately seven billion board-feet in 770 mills during 
1979, a boom year (Shinn, 1993). Three years later, the number of forest 
products industry employees dropped by 10,000, total number of 
processing sites dropped by 200, and total output of lumber dropped by 
about two billion board feet. By 1984, only 442 mills (sawmills, plywood, 
pulp and others) were reported in a Washington State survey (Shinn, 
1993). At the time, conventional wisdom suggested that the economic 
downturn would move toward recovery. Conventional wisdom was 
wrong. High price stumpage bid up in double digit inflation in 1979 and 
1980 and high lumber costs and imports combined with low demand for 
housing starts kept the economic downturn in place. Fundamental 
changes in the forest products industry occurred from 1982 to 1985. 
Plant closures, buyouts and land sales changed the face of business. 55 
The forest products industry has operated in an uncertain 
business environment for many years. Frederickson (1980) selected the 
sawmill industry to study because of its environmental instability. He 
reported that the sawmill industry ranked as the third least stable 
industry among fifty randomly selected industries. This environment is 
characterized by unstable log supplies, evolving milling technologies, an 
increased expectation for international trade, a shift to smaller second 
growth timber and the reduction of federal forest harvest levels. In 
addition, this sector has experienced continued public scrutiny of its 
operations with respect to environmental impacts.  Based on these 
factors, it is assumed that the firms selected have considerable 
experience with environmental regulations and environmental 
management and can knowledgeably respond to questions of what 
factors drive environmental performance. 
In light of the uncertainty in which these two firms operate, the 
research sought to identify certain internal characteristics thought to be 
linked to environmental performance which are indicative of firms 
responding to continued external pressures such as environmental 
regulations. 
Companies Surveyed 
Company A is a Fortune 500 company with approximately 13,000 
employees. It has 96 plants in 21 states with two main divisions: paper 
and building materials with 55 percent of sales coming from paper 
products. The company produces corrugated containers, pulp and 
paper, business forms, cut sheets, bags, inks, preprint, plywood lumber, 56
 
particleboard, engineered wood products, and medium density 
fiberboard. Net sales in 1995 were $3 billion. 
Company B is a Fortune 500 company employing approximately 
20,000 employees. It operates in 36 states, Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Mexico and the United Kingdom. Business lines include office products 
distribution, wood products and building materials distribution. Total 
sales are fairly evenly distributed among the business lines. Net sales for 
1996 were $5 billion. 
Both sources are operating in an environmentally sensitive sector 
of the economy, so their public exposure is similar. As a general 
observation, one company appeared to be more environmentally 
progressive, although that impression might depend on the individual 
personalities of the respondents. Several individuals from each company 
were interviewed, from environmental engineers at the facility to 
corporate attorneys. Each facility was informed that their company 
name would remain anonymous. 
A copy of the survey instrument is shown in Appendix A. The 
main areas of inquiry were: 
Basic facility information 
Corporate environmental policy (how long in existence, degree of 
integration, consistency throughout company, impact) 
Management commitment to environmental management 
Environmental performance measurement 
Training 
Motivation to go beyond regulations 57 
Human/financial resources allocated to environmental management 
Regulations (clarity, administrative burden, flexible/inflexible) 
Alternative approach to regulations 
Relationship with regulatory agencies 
Barriers to environmental performance 
Public influence on behavior 
Analysis of the survey responses was conducted at a general level, 
with emphasis on identifying broad trends. The survey instrument was 
designed to explore, at a qualitative level, the facility's experiences with 
different factors known to influence environmental performance;  it was 
not attempted to determine specific changes in corporate behavior under 
controlled conditions. Reflecting this qualitative approach, the study 
uses raw numbers of respondent answers to individual questions to 
describe the facility's experience with factors influencing its 
environmental performance. 
Staff from the environmental agency were informally interviewed 
without standard survey questions. Staff interviewed included those 
involved in writing rules, pollution prevention, compliance and 
enforcement, permit writing, inspection and technical assistance. 
Consultants and staff at an energy audit office were also informally 
interviewed. 
Caveats 
This evaluation is intended to determine the relative importance of 
certain internal and external factors and environmental performance. 58 
The study is intended to produce information on broad trends related to 
respondents' views on factors affecting their company's environmental 
performance. The number of companies surveyed and personnel 
interviewed, was small and was not large enough to provide any 
statistically significant relationships. 
The questionnaire was designed so that all questions and 
discussions were qualitative rather than quantitative. For example, 
survey respondents were asked to characterize the extent to which the 
corporate environmental policy affected change in their environmental 
management, but were not asked cost savings or to estimate waste 
reduction. 
Responses to the survey were provided voluntarily by both 
companies and regulatory personnel. Company personnel were read an 
Informed Consent which is presented in Appendix B. Survey bias was 
probably introduced among several levels, one being the quantity of 
open-ended questions. The respondents were informed that the surveyor 
worked for an environmental agency. Despite an understanding the 
study was being performed as a university project, and as such, all 
resulting information was to remain confidential as possible, the results 
should be taken with caution. Generally, the views of respondents and 
others involved in discussions were taken at face value. However, there 
is always the possibility of some bias in the views expressed. 
Discussions were not conducted under controlled conditions, although 
the surveyor attempted to ask questions objectively. 
Finally, the survey questions were based on asking questions on a 
"global" level, such as how external pressures manifests itself internally, 59 
as far as existence of an environmental hierarchy, rather than a "local" 
level where questions would be asked about how external pressures 
affect key operating decisions, such as production. These questions were 
asked of staff in environmental positions, rather than a variety of staff in 
other functioning areas of the business, to obtain the most pertinent 
information about environmental behavior. 60
 
Results and Conclusions 
The following results and conclusions were obtained from 
surveying the companies: 
Conclusion #1: Written corporate environmental policies establish the 
framework for integration of environmental issues, and demonstrate 
management's commitment to environmental performance. 
All respondents stated they had a corporate environmental policy, 
and that the policy was critical to overall environmental performance. 
One of the companies developed their policy as a result of an 
environmental threat. One respondent said it did not ensure 
environmental performance, since implementation of the policy was more 
important than the policy itself, but it set the tone for environmental 
management practices. Another stated he would look askance at a major 
corporation that did not have a written environmental policy. 
In both cases, the policy was the same for all facilities, corporate-
wide (which spanned different states), although it was specific to different 
divisions of the company. Respondents from both companies said it was 
not applied consistently which led to different environmental 
performance throughout the company. The main reason cited for 
inconsistent application had to do with the size of operations, and the 
difficulty of maintaining consistent performance. Differences in 
performance was primarily affected by the facility manager's 
interpretation and commitment to the policy. Other reasons cited were 
the presence of a contingency of "old timers" whose attitudes about the 
environment were slowly being replaced by new generations of workers. 61
 
Still others had to do with the amount of emphasis of a facility manager 
on environmental issues over safety. 
When asked whether the policy made a practical difference in 
operations and ultimately environmental performance, the responses 
were that environmental performance varied before and after 
introduction of the policy. It is difficult to assess exactly how much 
effect corporate environmental policies have on changing behavior, but 
the responses were uniform. All respondents from both companies said 
that corporate staff would have to "arm twist" operational staff before the 
policy was developed, to improve their environmental performance. 
Afterwards, the written policy gave new significance to upper 
management's commitment. One respondent observed that the policy 
endorsed the fact that the environment was an important part of the 
operating facility. 
When asked whether corporate or facility personnel had a greater 
impact on implementation, all respondents said it was the hourly staff at 
the facilities who were most responsible for making sure environmental 
goals were met since they were involved in the day-to-day operations and 
were the closest to the activities. As to how integrated the policy was 
throughout the organization, one respondent said their company 
restricted new chemical use until it was signed off by a number of people 
involved in environmental management. "It's like signing your life away 
to get a new chemical" was the response. The respondent said this 
compares to a time when chemical manufacturers routinely dropped off 
chemicals without much approval. A consistency of respondent answers 
was noted throughout all levels of responsibility, which seems to indicate 
fairly uniform integration of internal environmental policy. 62
 
Conclusion #2: Environmental performance tracking systems are 
necessary components of an integrated environmental management 
structure. 
All respondents described tracking systems in various stages of 
development. An environmental database was the minimum system 
described, which tracks upsets, penalties, number of violations, all of 
which were reported by facility personnel. One respondent said all 
incidents, including those that do not need to be reported to the 
regulatory agency, were included in the database. Another respondent 
said their environmental database was an albatross and was about to be 
updated by a more sophisticated system which integrates production 
information with environmental performance. Others said their tracking 
system was getting more sophisticated over time and they were beginning 
to develop profiles of each facility, and eventually will be able to do 
comparative analysis of all facilities. The original purpose, as reported 
by some respondents, was reporting to the Board of Directors. Now, the 
information is used throughout the company. When the next phase is 
complete, anyone on the network at one company will be able to access 
information on production and performance, can write their own 
program and analyze trends on waste differences between facilities and 
temporal variations. It was reported that most facility managers certify 
compliance with applicable regulations. 
The general response as to the type of environmental performance 
tracking mechanisms included environmental databases, annual internal 
audits, annual emissions inventory which included raw material 
utilization, monthly staff meetings where location managers report status 63 
of facilities, review by environmental engineers of plant specific 
equipment, and external reporting to regulatory agencies (e.g., quarterly 
reporting of equipment upsets). The major response of what was tracked 
was predominately upsets. When asked how respondents knew they 
were in compliance, one response provided was their annual internal 
environmental audit. In addition, one respondent said every three years 
an independent attorney and consultant was brought in to evaluate their 
operations, focusing mostly on how well the company is doing on 
documentation. When asked if there was a positive relationship between 
environmental tracking and environmental performance, the responses 
were almost unanimous. One respondent felt it was less important to be 
100 percent in compliance, than it was to see the numbers (e.g., waste 
generation) go down and to lessen swings in production. 
Conclusion #3: Linking job performance to environmental performance 
enhances a company's environmental performance. 
This question elicited different responses. Some did not know if 
job performance was linked to environmental performance, while others 
said some positions got bonuses for good environmental performance. 
When asked if job performance should be linked to environmental 
performance, all respondents believed it would make a big impact on 
environmental performance. Some said supervisors were paid bonuses 
on safety issues. 64
 
Conclusion #4: Financial resources are a barrier and incentive to 
environmental performance. 
None of the respondents had a clear sense of how much of the 
budget was allocated to environmental management, but several 
responded it was insufficient to meet increasing regulatory demands. 
One respondent talked about expenditures related not only to staying in 
compliance with regulatory requirements, but a public complaint forced 
them to make additional investments of $1.5 million for controls that 
went beyond compliance. Many responded that increasing 
administrative burdens related to regulatory requirements resulted in the 
need for additional staff. One responded that since the introduction of 
Title V operating permits, which has significant recordkeeping and 
monitoring requirements, they had to hire one full-time person to do 
nothing but manage that permit. While these comments relate to 
regulatory requirements, they point out a shift in financial priorities, 
which could be used for other efforts netting more direct environmental 
benefits. 
The majority responded that additional financial resources made 
available for environmental management would have a positive effect on 
environmental performance. When asked if that meant unlimited 
resources would result in outstanding environmental performance, the 
responses changed somewhat to a recognition that financial resources is 
one variable affecting environmental performance but several other 
factors must be present for efficient capital utilization. 
Other responses suggested economic "costs" of environmental 
regulations are also an incentive for firms to reduce costs of compliance. 65 
Conclusion #5: Regulatory requirements are another important barrier 
to environmental performance. 
Respondents were asked about whether the comprehensibility of 
regulations, and the relative burden of administrative requirements had 
an effect on environmental performance. Most responded that there was 
a relationship, with one offering the complexity of the regulation 
accounted for a significant difference in performance between two of their 
facilities in two different states. The overwhelming response was that the 
administrative burden, which was regulation-specific, interferred with 
environmental performance since resources were taken away from 
monitoring equipment, and other aspects of environmental management. 
Flexibility was cited as a possible solution. 
Conclusion #6: The relationship between companies and the 
environmental agency is important to the company's environmental 
performance. 
Almost all respondents said the quality of the relationship between 
their company and the regulatory agency affected their environmental 
performance. Some even stated they would welcome greater involvement 
of the agency in their daily operations, and would prefer to have a good 
working relationship with agency inspectors to work out compliance 
issues, as a preemptive measure to penalties and public involvement. 
When respondents were asked where they found out about most 
regulations, there seemed to be a relatively equal reliance on internal and 
external sources including trade associations, industry organizations, the 
regulatory agency and their legal department. When asked about the 
effect of early involvement in the regulatory process and ultimate 66
 
environmental performance, no one questioned the importance of early 
involvement in the regulatory process and its affect on how the 
regulation was implemented. In some cases, it was cited that their 
involvement helped set the standards of what they felt was reasonably 
achievable for their industry group. One respondent talked about 
involvement in new regulations which brought about a better 
understanding of why regulatory language is so broad, and information 
about others in their industry group that were affected by the regulation, 
which stimulated transfer of information between sources. Because 
regulations often affect a broad universe of regulated sources, this 
respondent stated that involvement in the rule development process gave 
him a better understanding of why regulations are often written with 
exceptions to help fit the regulation to such a broad group. 
Comments about the link between the regulatory agency and their 
companies ranged from agreement of its importance to ongoing 
compliance and ultimate performance, to the importance of a team 
approach where the agency and the company are going to make the 
regulation fit. One respondent talked about regular tours of their 
facilities with agency inspectors to increase the agency's understanding 
of their operations. This respondent was encouraged by technical 
assistance efforts by the agency, and felt the agency could do more non­
enforcement review opportunities. 
Conclusion #7: The public has undisputed power to influence firms' 
environmental behavior. 
The influence of the public on both companies, easily resulted in 
the most unanimous and strongest responses as to what influenced their 
environmental performance, which is what would be expected of two 67 
large, industrial companies doing business in very environmentally 
sensitive areas. More than any other variable tested, it was apparent 
that the public influenced their environmental business decisions on 
every level.  One respondent stated, "If the public didn't want us here, 
even if we met all the regulations, we wouldn't be." This was echoed by 
another respondent who said at one facility they were operating in 
compliance, but because of the public perception of some visible 
emissions, they installed additional controls in the amount of $1.5 
million that went beyond regulatory requirements. Most respondents 
said that public perception linked all of their facilities' performance that 
resulted in a public perception of the company as a whole, regardless of 
different compliance records at different facilities. The fact that public 
perception somehow links all facilities together, irrespective of facility 
differences, makes uniform application of corporate environmental 
directives important. Both companies appear to be well aware of the 
need for corporate-wide environmental consistency. 
The research upheld the hypothesis, and supports the position 
that a firm's environmental performance is related to a number of 
factors, many of which are internal firm characteristics related to its 
environmental infastructure. There appears to be a positive association 
between all the variables included in the survey and environmental 
performance. 68 
The following are averages of rankings of these variables using a 
Likert scale, with 1 being low in importance to environmental 
performance, 10 being high: 
Corporate Environmental Policy (9)
 
Upper management commitment to policy (9)
 
Other management commitment to policy (8)
 
Hourly staff commitment to policy (9)
 
Consistent application to policy (8)
 
Training on Corporate Environmental Policy (7) 
Training on regulations by company staff (7) 
Training on regulations by regulatory agency (8) 
Training on regulations by industry organization (8) 
Technical assistance by company staff (8) 
Technical assistance by regulatory agency (4)* 
Technical assistance by industry organization (8) 
Environmental performance tracking (7)
 
Compensation linked to environmental performance (8)
 
Adequate financial resources allocated to environmental management (8) 
Adequate human resources allocated to environmental management (8) 
Regulations (clarity) (8) 
Regulations (administrative requirements; does this have a negative 
effect on performance) (8) 
Relationship with regulatory agency (9) 
Public influence (9) 
*Lower ranking due to some respondents suggesting agency staff 
turnovers makes the agency an unreliable source for technical 
assistance. 69
 
The major findings of the study are:
 
1.	  Internal characteristics in firms are linked to environmental 
performance; 
2.	  Financial factors are both an incentive and disincentive to 
environmental performance; 
3.	  Flexibility and certainty in regulatory strategies are key factors 
affecting environmental performance; and 
4.	  The public is one of the strongest motivators for (some) firms 
to improve environmental performance. 
One observation is added on the issue of inconsistent application 
of corporate environmental directives. Large firms are comprised of staff 
who specialize in certain parts of the organization. They are recruited 
specifically to perform a specialized role, have work and educational 
backgrounds related to that role and see career advancement related to 
that role. Consequently, businesses may be composed of staff with very 
different perspectives, interests and approaches to their work which may 
also affect environmental performance. The specialization of staff also 
presents a challenge for understanding environmental integration. The 
staff responsible for a business's environmental management may be 
quite removed from those responsible for designing, producing and 
marketing the firm's products. This separation is problematic for 
instituting certain environmental strategies that need to be addressed in 
core business decisions such as those involving product design, 
production process design, operation and maintenance. 70
 
Recommendations 
The recommendations originate from all parts of the study: 
literature review, survey results, and informal interviews with city, state 
and federal environmental agencies, consultants, an industry 
representative and academe. 
The following describes the proposed recommendation aimed at 
State environmental agencies, Oregon Department of Environmental 
Quality in particular, which seeks to address the major findings of the 
study. Where the recommendation cites "agency" or "environmental 
agency", this is meant to refer to Oregon Department of Environmental 
Quality. Many of these recommendations do not neatly fit under just one 
"major finding" heading; rather, there is considerable overlap in that 
many of these recommendations apply to more than one heading. For 
example, technical assistance has been shown to ameliorate economic 
barriers, can address regulatory uncertainty issues raised by firms (e.g. 
clarify misunderstandings about requirements), and may be part of a 
flexible regulatory initiative. 
It should be noted that the recommendations offered do not 
represent a significant change from the current regulatory system; 
rather it represents minor modifications offered to the majority of firms. 
Agencies may want to address smaller classes of firms with exemplary 
environmental records separately with stronger "carrots". The 
recommendation can be characterized as having a command and control 
"framework", in that standards and basic requirements remain the same; 
However, flexibility is incorporated throughout as a "carrot" to address 
firm disincentives, and is accompanied by fee structures and 71
 
enforcement and compliance components as "sticks". Despite 
considerable current discussion about radical shifts in regulatory 
programs, there are fundamental elements that must be in place to 
ensure continued or improved environmental progress.  However, 
improvements in the overall system are warranted. 
A process of assessing the effectiveness of regulatory tools is 
described in Tables 1 and 2. There are many stakeholders involved in 
environmental issues, but the major competing interests addressed are 
impacts to industry, impacts to the environment and impacts to the 
agency. Table 1 lists criteria used to assess the effectiveness of 
regulatory tools and supporting items under each heading and Table 2 
rates the effectiveness of select regulatory tools in meeting these criteria. 
For instance, design standards are rated as reliable in terms of meeting 
the criteria of impact to air quality (e.g. demonstrating environmental 
results), but not as good in terms of the criteria of impact to industry in 
that it may be restrictive in offering firms implementation choices. 
It should also be noted that even if regulatory strategies address 
some or all of the incentives and disincentives reported in the study, this 
may not be sufficient to result in improved environmental performance. 
Many factors drive a firm's behavior. Technical barriers, for instance, 
which were not addressed in the study, are known to be disincentives for 
some firms. It is also not known what the relative importance of one 
incentive is over another, and if use of one incentive versus two or three 
together changes behavior. For instance, while regulatory flexibility was 
found to be a key factor related to environmental performance, some 
interviews indicated regulatory relief alone may not be a big driver for 72
 
some firms unless the firm can be shown tangible benefits of the 
initiative. 
Although there are several documented examples of successful 
nontraditional regulatory programs that attempt to address firm 
incentives and disincentives, it is seldom a straightforward task to find 
out what originally motivated a firm to change its behavior. Many 
business decisions are made irrespective of regulatory pressures, and fall 
under the heading of "good business practices", meaning the motivation 
was strictly internal, and for reasons other than the regulatory 
requirement itself. Unpacking a firm's environmental behavior beyond 
the broad headings of incentives and disincentives is clearly beyond the 
scope of this study. 
Recommendation#1: Identify internal characteristics in firms that are 
linked to environmental performance. 
It was hypothesized that there is a link between certain internal 
characteristics of a firm related to the degree of integration of 
environmental issues in the organization (e.g. environmental 
performance tracking systems, corporate environmental policy) and its 
environmental performance. These factors are indicative of how a firm 
has responded to continued external pressures, such as regulatory 
demands. The hypothesis was confirmed by the survey and informal 
interviews. Environmental management systems allow firms to 
systematically deal with environmental challenges. 
The literature describes organizational models as depicting firms 
as they transition through "stages" of development as they seek to adapt 73 
to environmental pressures. The beginning stage of "Adjustment" was 
characterized by firms responding in a reactive, crisis management mode 
attacking environmental problems on a case-by-case basis without 
institutionalizing environmental issues. "Adaptation" is the second stage 
suggested where firms seriously reassess environmental values and 
begin integrating environmental issues into their decision hierarchy. The 
final stage of "Innovation" was described as firms with fully integrated 
environmental management systems cutting across all functioning parts 
of the organization. But, what can regulators do to influence the 
progression of firms through these stages? 
The proposed recommendation recognizes the limitations 
regulators have on influencing how firms respond to policy initiatives. 
However, it is theorized that there are some ways regulators can 
influence this process such as through enforcement actions. 
The importance of agencies continuing enforcement actions cannot 
be understated. Despite industry pressures that seek to reduce or 
eliminate agency enforcement efforts, enforcement needs to remain a 
constant incentive to deter bad environmental performance, and to 
stimulate firms to continually improve or maintain good environmental 
performance. It is strongly recommended that any regulatory approach 
adopted, whether command and control or market-incentives, include an 
enforcement component. 
Enforcement efforts can incorporate innovative techniques such as 
pollution prevention requirements, or extended compliance times for 
sources seeking innovative technologies; nonetheless, enforcement 
should serve as a backbone to regulatory efforts. As State environmental 74 
agencies consider market-based regulatory approaches, they need to 
ensure there is no "back door" for sources to slip through.  Enforcement 
can also be linked to another strong motivator for firms  the public, if 
enforcement actions are made public. 
One of the ways enforcement actions serve as an incentive to firms 
is it can focus the attention of upper management on environmental 
issues. As one survey respondent stated, "Nothing gets the attention of 
upper management like an enforcement action." Enforcement actions 
can initiate a chain reaction in firms and can be an important motivator 
to move firms out of the "investigative" stages to "implementation" stages 
for prevention or control of pollution. It sends a strong message as to the 
agency's commitment to pollution prevention and control. Some firms 
have reported (April, 1997) that if it wasn't for government-imposed taxes 
and subsequent enforcement actions related to Chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFC's), they would have continued its use. Other companies' bad 
compliance records can motivate them to stay ahead of the regulatory 
curve to avoid future enforcement actions. 
State environmental agencies are encouraged, to the extent 
possible, to pursue enforcement actions, and to incorporate innovative 
pollution prevention and pollution control strategies as part of the action. 75
 
Recommendation#2: Use financial factors as an incentive 
Clearly economic considerations are of paramount importance to 
most firms. Financial issues affect every aspect of a firm and form the 
basis of key business decisions. Environmental regulations affect a 
firm's financial resources in terms of equipment choices, operational 
decisions, and direct and indirect compliance costs. The financial 
consequence of complying with environmental regulations can be both an 
incentive and disincentive to environmental performance. 
The incentive is for firms to reduce their compliance costs: raw 
materials, recovery of valuable materials, utility costs, permit fees and 
other compliance costs. The disincentive financial issues represent are 
capital costs for pollution control equipment, uncertain economic 
benefits for unconventional technologies, long payoff periods for future 
cost savings, and costly downtimes for required equipment retrofits. The 
unavailability of capital which may be especially true for firms with small 
profit margins, can prevent firms from improving their environmental 
practices. It may also prevent firms from implementing changes in their 
operation with good payoff potential. Firms with tight cashflows and low 
equity values for their facilities may find capital difficult to obtain. 
Lenders look for stability and profitability. Firms with small profit 
margins, in particular, need economic certainty before trying innovative 
technologies. Any technology considered by any firm must exceed their 
average rate of return on equity. 
The impact of the cost of regulatory compliance often depends on 
firm size and profitability. Small firms obviously do not have the 
financial flexibility of most large firms. Typically they have fewer 76 
resources, less technical expertise and are not advantaged by things 
such as economies of scale. R & D costs for new technologies and 
processes may be prohibitive for smaller firms and complex 
environmental management systems and total cost accounting may not 
be practical for these firms. The implication to regulators is to 
understand the different pressures and incentives and disincentives that 
fall along firm size, when targeting firms for different regulatory 
initiatives. 
Fees as motivators 
It is recommended that State environmental agencies maintain the 
current fee structure that exists for air quality sources.  This is despite 
increased pressures by industry to reduce or eliminate certain fees. The 
command and control system admittedly has administrative features 
that could be streamlined to save both the agency and firms financial 
resources. However, one reason command and control approaches 
continue to be the backbone of regulatory programs may be they are less 
of a drain to agencies, with a few exceptions, than more flexible market-
based approaches. Market-based systems demand more agency 
resources. If firms want flexibility in implementing regulatory 
requirements, the minimum requirement recommended is fees. In 
addition, state agencies are obligated under the Clean Air Act to maintain 
fully supporting programs such as Title V operating permits. 
The second reason to maintain current fee structures is to take 
advantage of the continued economic incentive for firms to reduce their 
emissions. While not all firms seek to optimize returns, it is assumed 
that most firms do; therefore economic incentives are an important part 77 
of any regulatory approach. Linking fees to emission levels may be an 
important incentive for some firms to reduce their pollution. Clearly this 
is not universally true, especially for very profitable firms or for firms 
who feel compliance costs outweigh the risk of enforcement actions. 
Linking industry fees to the amount of pollution generated addresses the 
failure of the market to internalize the costs of environmental pollution. 
By internalizing the costs of pollution, regulatory agencies theoretically 
serve as a protection of resources commonly held. Making emission fees 
a function of improved production efficiency introduces a positive profit 
incentive for firms. 
Expand use of market-based regulatory "tools" to help firms 
overcome financial disincentive to environmental performance 
Sources of air pollution in Oregon are currently restricted in their 
use of certain market-based "tools" such as bubbling and emissions 
trading. Bubbling allows firms to average emissions while emissions 
trading allows firms to "buy" emission reductions from external firms to 
meet regulatory requirements. Use of these tools is restricted for a 
variety of reasons. Federal requirements prohibit use of bubbling to 
meet "RACT" (Reasonably Achievable Control Technology) to ensure firms 
are meeting current technology standards. Compliance demonstrations 
while not impossible, can be more difficult under these strategies. 
Finally, bubbling and emissions trading require additional agency 
resources to administer. If these issues can be overcome, it is 
recommended State environmental agencies expand the use of these and 
other market-incentive tools to allow firm's flexibility in seeking cost-
effective solutions to environmental problems. 78 
A note of caution is warranted in that allowing firms to seek cost-
effective solutions to compliance problems may not necessarily ensure 
continued technological improvement. Market-incentives must be 
coupled with technological requirements when old technologies are 
replaced by more efficient technologies. This can be accomplished by 
requiring retrofits or equipment replacements when firms exceed certain 
emission thresholds. This ensures the airshed will continually improve 
as existing firms expand, or as new firms enter the area. 
An example of how bubbling can help firms overcome financial 
constraints related to environmental compliance is a firm, for example, 
that operates two coating lines that emit volatile organic compounds 
(VOC). If the standard is 3.5 lb VOC/gallon of coating, bubbling would 
allow this firm to overcontrol the most cost-effective line, while 
undercontrolling the other line, as long as the average emissions from 
both lines do not exceed 3.5 lb VOC/gallon of coating. Bubbling could 
have significance to firms who have military contracts for instance, that 
specify use of certain coatings which may result in emissions that exceed 
current standards. 
Firms may be able to overcome financial barriers to environmental 
performance through emissions trading. Expanding the use of emissions 
trading would in effect allow the market to seek out the lowest cost 
emission reductions "for sale" for firms to meet regulatory requirements. 
Pre-approved permit changes may also help some firms who meet 
minimum criteria such as compliance record and compliance 
demonstration capabilities, overcome economic barriers related to 
environmental requirements. This might be a strong incentive for quick­79 
to-market firms such as high technology or pharmaceutical companies. 
This market-incentive might be offered in exchange for overcompliance. 
Recommendation#3: Use technical assistance wherever possible 
Technical assistance can also help firms to overcome economic 
barriers related to environmental performance. Environmental agencies 
can offer technical assistance focusing on waste minimization, pollution 
prevention opportunities, user-friendly cost accounting systems, waste 
audits and regulatory requirements checklists. Technical assistance can 
be a powerful tool in helping firms reduce costs. 
A hazardous waste generator assistance program conducted by the 
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality involving 139 firms 
resulted in significant improvements in hazardous waste reduction. 
Sixty-five percent of the facilities visited made major improvements. 
Among this program's findings was that proactive targeting can be a 
major contributor to increased compliance, pollution prevention and 
waste reduction. It also found that proactive technical assistance can 
achieve a high level of acceptance within the regulated community. One 
of the key successes of this program was a simplified one-page "Action 
Form" filled out by the facility that outlined hazardous waste 
determination needs, other generator waste management requirements 
and waste reduction recommendations. The high level of participation in 
using this form which resulted in significant hazardous waste 
improvements was attributed to the form's simplicity and the agency's 
follow up and cooperative attitude. The effects of technical assistance 
efforts is well documented and should be a continued part of the State 80 
environmental agencies' efforts to help firms overcome economic barriers 
to perform. 
Recommendation#4: Use a combination of flexibility and certainty in 
regulatory strategies 
Implementation flexibility is an important incentive for firms as 
they seek to adapt regulatory requirements to their facility.  One of the 
assertions of this study was that the current prescriptive, one-size-fits-all 
regulatory approach is resulting in diminished environmental returns. 
This approach does not address differences in firms related to their 
resources, priorities, operational differences, profit margins, operating 
costs and incentives and disincentives which may cause firms to vary in 
their response to regulatory initiatives. 
The need to consider alternative regulatory approaches is 
exemplified by pollution control costs that are beginning to outpace 
environmental gains. Efforts to achieve continued compliance with 
environmental goals can be facilitated by incorporating certain flexible 
components to the overall regulatory approach such as extending 
compliance deadlines for firms adopting innovative technologies, and use 
of certain market-based regulatory tools which was discussed in a 
previous section. 
Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEP) are an example of a 
flexible compliance mechanism. The Oregon Department of 
Environmental Quality is encouraged to continue its use of SEP's in 
addition to considering other innovative compliance mechanisms that 
allow firms to participate in their compliance demonstration. SEP's allow 81 
firms to mitigate civil penalties in exchange for implementing 
environmental projects such as pollution prevention. SEP's are looked 
upon most favorably when a firm has self-reported a violation and has 
shown a willingness to correct the violation in a timely manner. SEP's 
are typically most appropriate for first-time violators rather than firms 
with long compliance records. Penalties for violations that were willfully 
ignored or have a criminal component are not eligible for SEP's. A firm 
can use an approved SEP to mitigate up to 80 percent of the penalty 
through pollution prevention or other methods or preventing or reducing 
the pollutant(s) involved in the violation. 
Agencies are also encouraged to offer extended compliance times 
especially when firms are implementing uncertain technologies in an 
attempt to comply with a standard. This may be true not only for 
innovative technologies, but for some "off the shelf" technologies. 
Technical uncertainties associated with changing to an unfamiliar 
process coupled with the need to meet an emission limit within a certain 
time frame can be an overwhelming disincentive to firms who need some 
measure of certainty to avoid the risk of noncompliance. 
Incorporating pollution prevention requirements into enforcement 
actions is another example of offering firms flexible compliance 
mechanisms. However, most firms prefer certainty and opt to just pay a 
fine and go back to business as compared to trying pollution prevention 
which may lead to uncertain results. Pollution prevention has a higher 
burden of proof than conventional end-of-pipe technologies which may 
explain why some firms will not adopt it. Despite this limitation, whether 
a firm adopts a conventional end-of-pipe technology or a more market­82 
driven technological approach is highly influenced by the cooperation of 
the agency and the flexibility of compliance mechanisms. 
Recommendation#5: Use inspectors as key players in developing 
cooperative relationships between firms and the agency 
Inspectors play an important role in developing a cooperative 
relationship between the firm and the environmental agency. They can 
be the firm's first line of communication to the regulated entity. 
Inspectors can develop ongoing relationships with facilities working with 
them to achieve compliance. 
The opportunity for an environmental agency inspector to develop 
such a relationship with firms depends on a number of things: the 
environmental program (e.g. degree of self-reporting), agency funding 
priorities, number of firms regulated by program (e.g. frequency of 
inspections), complexity of the program (e.g. need for inspections), 
personalities of the inspector and staff at the firm, and of course 
willingness of the firm to exercise the option of an agency inspection. 
There are variations between environmental programs that lead to 
different compliance needs for both the firm and the agency. Title V is an 
example of how compliance needs change for the agency and for firms. 
Title V is an operating permit program which was one of the major 
outcomes of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments required of all states. 
Title V is unquestionably the most comprehensive air quality regulation 
promulgated in years. Title V organizes all the air quality obligations of a 
"major" source (emit/potential to emit > 100 tpy of any regulated 
pollutant) into one permit. With the exception of hazardous air 
pollutants, the Title V operating permit program does not require any 83 
stricter standards. However, it does require a greater responsibility for 
firms to monitor, report and to certify compliance with the conditions of 
the permit. Another new feature under Title V is firms must report on 
compliance every 6 months. A designated representative of the firm 
must certify compliance and if found to be in noncompliance, could be 
imprisoned for up to 5 years with fines reaching $250,000. 
Approximately 200 firms in Oregon are subject to Title V requirements. 
The impact of Title V is a significant workload increase to the 
agency in helping firms compile data, reviewing old source test data for 
sufficiency, requiring new source test data, and analyzing monitoring, 
recordkeeping, reporting and other information to ensure compliance. 
Each Title V permit can take one permit writer up to 2 years to process. 
The inspector's role with regard to Title V needs to be one of 
flexibility considering the "wide net" Title V cast which includes firms 
that were unaware parts of their operations were subject to this new 
requirement. 
Air quality inspectors may have the opportunity to develop closer 
relationships with the firms they are responsible for, than hazardous 
waste inspectors for instance. This is because hazardous waste 
inspections can be very time consuming when compared to air quality 
inspections, which means fewer inspections due to resource constraints. 
In addition, the universe of hazardous waste firms is much larger than 
for air quality firms. This means the turnover rate for hazardous waste 
inspections is much slower than air quality inspections. What this 
means is that air quality inspectors have a unique opportunity to develop 84
 
closer relationships with firms, to understand their compliance needs 
and the affect environmental outcomes. 
The program (hazardous waste versus air quality) may set the tone 
for the relationship between regulated and regulator. RCRA (Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act) which governs hazardous waste sources, 
is reported as "pickier" when it comes to paper trails, for instance, than 
the Clean Air Act. In fact, most RCRA violations are reported to be paper 
violations. On the other hand, hazardous waste violations might be 
easier to spot than air quality violations since spilled drums are easier to 
pick out than an "invisible" air emission. 
Notwithstanding a temporary increase in air quality violations 
immediately following the introduction of Title V, in recent years there 
generally have been more hazardous waste violations than air quality 
violations. But many factors account for the disparity: funding 
differences between programs, ratio of inspectors to regulated sources; 
number of "enforceable" actions in one program over another; and degree 
of self-reporting. The relationship between the inspector and the facility 
is one of many factors influencing a firm's environmental performance. 
The importance of the State environmental agency continuing 
inspections for both enforcement and non-enforcement purposes is very 
important in influencing firm environmental performance. Inspections 
are especially critical to small to medium firms who have limited 
resources. These firms may rely on outside sources for technical 
expertise. Agency inspectors can help these firms overcome technical 
barriers. In addition, overcoming communication barriers between a 
government agency, with its own language, perspective, and priorities, 85 
and a firm which operates in the market with its own set of priorities and 
language. Clearly, this intersection between firm and agency represents 
a multitude of problems when attempting to initiate a regulation. Some 
smaller shops have workers with a high school education.  Agency 
inspectors describing "potential to emit" may mean nothing to these 
workers who are focused on production needs. What might make more 
sense is talking about emissions in terms of "gallons of coating" used. 
Learning to speak a similar language can help overcome 
misunderstandings about regulatory requirements. 
Aqueous parts cleaners are an example of how technical assistance 
can be used in concert with regulatory requirements to achieve 
environmental goals. Seven years ago aqueous parts cleaners were fairly 
new and used only by adventurous firms. Today with the phase-out of 
ozone depletors and a growing regulatory discouragement for use of 
chlorinated solvents, aqueous solutions are used in conservative firms. 
But this shift may not have taken place without the technical outreach of 
environmental agencies. Agency inspectors can fill a crucial gap in 
providing firms technical information and in promoting certain waste 
management hierarchies such as EPA's reduce, reuse, recycle. 
Environmental agencies are encouraged to make inspections and 
trained inspectors a high priority since firm-agency relationships are 
critical to continued environmental performance. 86
 
Recommendation#6: Use a "common sense" approach to 
interpretation/implementation of regulations 
State environmental agencies can improve their approach to 
interpreting and implementing regulatory requirements. Staff at 
environmental agencies may interpret regulations in a strict sense 
overlooking a common sense approach which questions the intent of the 
requirement. State environmental agencies have some constraint in 
interpreting and implementing regulations due to federal oversight. 
Where flexibility exists, the recommendation is for staff at these agencies 
to question the discernible environmental benefit of regulatory 
interpretation and implementation decisions. Rulewriters, permit 
writers, inspectors and management at state environmental agencies 
affect how firms will comply with regulatory requirements. Adopting 
more of a common sense approach to writing, interpreting and applying 
regulations may improve environmental outcomes as it may provide 
increased implementation flexibility for firms along with regulatory 
certainty when requirements are consistently applied. 
An example of using a common sense approach to interpreting and 
implementing regulatory requirements has to do with the concept of 
"potential to emit" The definition of potential to emit as found in 
Oregon Administrative Rules 340-028-0110 is "...the maximum capacity 
of a stationary source to emit any air pollutant under its physical and 
operational design." Calculation of a potential to emit includes an 
assumption (based on maximum capacity of the facility) that the facility 
is operating 8760 hours/year, 365 days/year, with all shifts in operation. 
If strictly applied, this would mean small gas stations would be subject 
to requirements meant for larger sources. Clearly gas stations and other 
facilities have obvious limitations to their operations. If a gas station has 87 
twenty pumps, it would be a physical impossibility to assume cars would 
occupy all pumps at the same time, and the station would pump gas 24 
hours a day. A more common sense approach would tell us there are 
operational limitations that should be accounted for when determining 
applicability to certain regulatory requirements. 
Another example of taking a common sense approach to 
regulations is a facility with a natural gas boiler with fuel oil used as a 
backup in the event of curtailments or maintenance. Assuming the 
boiler is used just for heating, a realistic approach would be to assume 
the boiler would heat just the surrounding area, and would be in 
operation five or six months of the year. But a strict interpretation would 
be based on the facility operating this equipment at maximum capacity: 
8760 hours a year, 12 months and so on. These are two examples of 
many opportunities environmental agencies have for taking a realistic 
approach to regulating firms. 
Providing firms with regulatory certainty is another key factor in 
getting firms to adopt environmental goals. One way agencies can 
provide firms with regulatory certainty is to involve firms to participate in 
proposed regulatory actions. Another way is to provide clear, measurable 
environmental goals. A third way is to offer, where possible, economic 
justification of requirements. For instance, a requirement that costs 
firms $500,000 a year to administer might not pass the economic 
justification test where it might make better economic sense to direct a 
portion of those costs to actual pollution control. If firms cannot see the 
economic justification of a requirement, the environmental goal may not 
be fully adopted. Hollow paperwork exercises shift valuable resources 88 
away from bottom line environmental results, both for the agency and 
firms, and they minimize the credibility of the environmental objective. 
Finally, agencies that attempt to write clear rules, and seek to 
improve consistency in terms of intepretation and implementation will 
improve regulatory certainty for firms which may help to enhance their 
their environmental performance. These are lofty goals for state 
environmental agencies with dwindling budgets, marginalized political 
power and a diffuse staff which makes consistency difficult if not 
impossible, but improvements can be made. 
Recommendation#7: Encourage the public to assess their influence on 
environmental compliance by firms 
Firms vary in their response and sensitivity to public pressure 
which may depend on the interface between their products and processes 
and the public. Not all firms are influenced by public scrutiny. All parts 
of the study revealed that many firms are influenced by the public. 
Whether through market choices in their products, or in influencing 
process decisions. The example of a significant abnormal negative stock 
devaluation of many firms immediately following disclosure of their Toxic 
Release Inventory data required under Superfund was discussed in the 
literature review section. 1986 was the last year, as part of the 
Superfund requirement, that air polluters were publicly required to 
disclose their emission levels. 
The majority of rule development, interpretation and 
implementation is predominated by large industrial sources and their 
attorneys, industry lobbyists and associations. Industry unquestionably 89
 
has more influence on the regulatory process as with the legislative 
process than any other stakeholder. 
Because state environmental agencies currently have weakened 
political power in Oregon, it is recommended that the agency not be 
directly involved in using the public as a quasi-regulatory tool. Instead, 
it is recommended the state environmental agency make use of a third-
party to initiate such actions. Sierra Club, or other environmental 
groups or public interest groups could search agency records for a list of 
the top polluters and could have the local newspapers print the 
information, which has been done in past years. Surprising little public 
involvement takes place at the state environmental agency save a few 
minor showings at truely controversial hearings where newspaper 
headlines have drawn public interest. 
Risking industry revolt, state environmental agencies could seek to 
develop more public involvement in governing environmentally regulated 
entities. This could be done by inviting interested public members to sit 
on advisory committees when discussing proposed rule language, to get 
involved in environmental assistance projects in concert with other 
regulatory agencies, to work with the agency on neighborhood projects 
such as developing "Good Neighbor Agreements" with industrial sources 
of hazardous air pollutants, and by participating in expanded public 
review of permit actions in exchange for more flexibility offered to firms in 
certain permit exemptions. Enforcement and compliance actions can 
also have more public involvement components. In addition, agencies 
can do more public outreach efforts working with school-age children in 
beginning to shape their perception of environmental issues. 90 
Any recommendation to involve the public in regulated industrial 
sources is tempered by the agency's politically compromised position; 
However, to the extent possible, State environmental agencies are 
encouraged to consider utilizing market forces such as the public to 
apply pressure to firms to influence their environmental performance. 
Recommendations for Further Study 
This study examined global incentives and disincentives of 
organizations, such as protecting profitability from external pressures 
such as regulatory demands and the influence of the public on firm 
behavior. It is recommended that additional studies examine how 
incentives and disincentives drive business practices on a local level (e.g., 
how incentives and pressures affect operating decisions; how marketing 
measures its performance versus production). 
Another area deserving further study is an examination of the 
reasons for noncompliance (e.g., production inefficiencies, how the firm 
is structured  are there links between those responsible for 
environmental performance and the policy initiative?). An evaluation of 
key activities that lead to poor environmental performance could be 
included. 
A study could be conducted to determine the association between 
regulatory tools and emission reductions. This would be an evaluation of 
the extent to which a given regulatory tool (e.g., technical assistance) is 
associated with an increased tendency to prevent pollution. These 91 
studies can improve the understanding of both the causal links and the 
relative impacts of regulatory tools. 
Finally, patterns to variation of firm response to different 
regulatory initiatives tools could be identified. An assessment of the 
prevalence of these different responses to different motivating factors 
conducted of a large sample to eliminate sample bias would be 
informative. 92
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Appendix A
 
Survey Instrument
 
I.	  Policy Directives 
A.	  Corporate Environmental Policy 
1.	  Do you have a Corporate Environmental Policy? (IF NO SKIP TO 
NEXT SECTION) 
2.	  How long have you had the policy? 
3.	  Why was it developed (e.g. environ crises, public pressure, etc.) 
4.	  What part of the organization was the primary author? 
5.	  Who contributed to the policy, and what was the process of 
involvement? 
6.	  Is the policy the same for all facilities? 
7.	  Does the policy really guide decisions at a facility level? 
8.	  Does the policy change behavior? How? 
9.	  How would things be different without the policy? 
10.	  What effect does the policy have on compliance with regulations? 
11.	  Who has primary responsibility for insuring goals of the policy 
are carried out? 
12.	  Do you feel management (company-wide) is committed to the 
policy? 
13.	  Do you feel management (facility-wide) is committed to the 
policy? 
14.	  How important is a company-wide commitment to the policy, 
in terms of achieving environmental goals? 99 
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Survey Instrument
 
15.	  How important is a facility-wide commitment to the policy, 
in terms of achieving enviromental goals? 
16.	  Who do you feel has a greater impact on making sure 
environmental goals are met: corporate or facility staff? 
II. Measurement and Tracking of Environmental Practices 
A.	  Facility-Wide Measurement of Environmental Performance 
1.	  How is environmental performance measured at your facility? 
At the corporate level? 
2.	  IF MEASUREMENT DIFFERENT: Does this difference affect 
environmental performance? 
3.	  Is there a contingency plan if any of the environmental 
objectives are not met? 
4.	  How is enviromental performance tracked? 
5.	  How much effort is spent on tracking environmental performance? 
(frequency of reporting, etc.) 
6.	  How would you rank your overall environmental performance? 
7.	  How do you know when you are out of compliance with 
regulations? 
III.	  Training and Regulations 
1.	  How is staff trained on environmental directives? 
2.	  How do you find out about new regulations? 100 
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Survey Instrument
 
3.	  How do you get trained on new regulations? 
4.	  What affect does training of regulations have on environmental 
performance? 
5.	  What does having a reliable source to contact with questions 
about regulations have on environmental performance? 
6.	  How comprehensible (in general) are most air regulations? 
7.	  What affect does how easy regulations are to understand 
have on environmental performance? 
IV.	  Relationship with Environmental Agency 
1.	  Do you know who to contact at the state agency for questions 
about regulations? 
2.	  Do you think technical assistance offered by the state agency 
affects environmental performance? 
3.	  Are you involved with rule development with the state agency? 
SKIP TO #5 IF NO. 
4.	  IF YES: Does early involvement in rule development make a 
difference in your firm's environmental performance? 
5.	  How would you rate your relationship with the state agency? 
6.	  Do you find the state agency to be responsive? 
7.	  How could your relationship with the state agency be improved? 
8.	  How does your working relationship with the state agency 
affect your firm's environmental performance? 101
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Survey Instrument
 
V.	  Resource Allocation to Environmental Management 
1.	  How many full time staff are involved in environmental 
management at your facility? Company wide? 
2.	  Any idea what percentage of total facility budget is devoted 
to environmental management (direct/indirect costs). 
3.	  Is job performance linked to environmental performance? 
4.	  IF NO: Should it be? Would it make a difference on environmental 
performance? 
VI.	  Impact of Public on Firm Behavior 
1.	  How close is your facility to a residential area? 
2.	  How close are you to other industrial sources of air pollution? 
3.	  Any idea how many public complaints your facility receives 
a year? Type of complaints? 
4.	  What does your firm do in response to most public complaints? 
5.	  How important is public perception of your facility? 
6.	  Does the public influence your environmental practices? 102 
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Survey Instrument
 
PLEASE RANK THE FOLLOWING IN TERMS OF IMPORTANCE TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE (1 being low; 10 being high) 
Internal Factors 
1.	  Corporate Environmental Policy 
2.	  Upper management commitment to policy 
3.	  Other management commitment to policy 
4.	  Hourly staff commitment to policy 
5.	  Consistent application of policy 
6.	  Training on Corporate Environmental Policy 
7.	  Training on regulations by company staff 
8.	  Training on regulations by regulatory agency 
9.	  Training on regulations by industry organization 
10.	  Technical assistance by company staff 
11.	  Technical assistance by regulatory agency 
12.	  Technical assistance by industry organization 
13.	  Environmental performance tracking 
14.	  Compensation linked to environmental performance 
15.	  Adequate financial resources allocated to environmental 
management 
16.	  Adequate human resources allocated to environmental 
management 
External Factors 
17.	  Regulations (clarity) 
18.	  Regulations (administrative requirements; does this have a 
negative effect on performance) 
19.	  Relationship with regulatory agency 
20.	  Public influence 103
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Informed Consent Read To Respondents 
I am an Oregon State University student working on a thesis that 
involves researching industrial sources of air pollution.  I need your help 
to determine factors that affect the environmental performance of major 
industrial sources of air pollution. Do you have a few minutes right now 
for me to give you an overview of what this is about? 
Your participation will involve two telephone conversations [or one 
interview in-person], more if needed, although it is not anticipated, with 
each conversation lasting approximately 45 minutes [approximately two
hours for one interview in-person. 30 minutes if a follow up 
interview, telephone or in-person, is necessary. Location for the in-
person interview is whatever is convenient for you]. It may also 
involve faxing to you in advance, an outline of the areas our conversation 
will cover, or additional information, as needed.  I am happy to schedule 
these interviews at your convenience, and if we get interrupted and either 
of us need to return to work, I would be glad to reschedule. 
Your participation is completely voluntary and you may 
discontinue participation at any time; however, your participation is very 
important, and is greatly appreciated. Although I am a public employee 
of a state agency, I am conducting this survey as a University student 
and any information you share is held confidential, and the name of your 
company will not be identified. If you have questions about this study at 
any time, you may contact my major professor, Kenneth Williamson at 
541-737-6836. If you do decide to contact Dr. Williamson, I'd remind 
you do not need to reveal your identity, just that you are part of my 
thesis work. 
The benefits that are anticipated from this work include a better 
understanding of how major industrial sources of air pollution make 
decisions that ultimately affect environmental performance. The results 
may help businesses, such as yours, to understand what factors, 
internal and external, are important to the operation of the business and 
how those factors affect environmental compliance. This understanding 
could help to redirect resources. 104
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Informed Consent Read To Respondents 
It may also stimulate new thinking about alternative approaches to 
environmental compliance based on the most important factors 
identified. In other words, if operational flexibility is very important, is 
there a way to preserve operational flexibility while still meeting 
regulatory requirements? EPA and state agencies are receptive to 
hearing about innovative approaches that both preserve what is 
important to business, while achieving environmental objectives. 
This information could also benefit state agencies to focus their 
efforts when it comes to choosing policy instruments that align with what 
motivates regulated sources of air pollution. Finally, it is hoped this 
work will give environmental rulewriters, state and federal, new insights 
into what motivates business, which should be useful when they develop 
policy instruments, since they are attempting to change behavior. 
Thank you for your time.  I hope you will be willing to participate, 
and if so, I would like to schedule the telephone interviews [in-person 
interview] as soon as your schedule allows, since my thesis needs to be 
completed this summer. Do you have any questions? 105
 
Appendix C 
Interview Participants 
Informal interviews were conducted on the telephone and in person 
with city, state and federal environmental agency staff, consultants, staff 
in academe, energy alliance organization staff, and an industry 
representative. These discussions were conducted to determine what 
factors were important to firms when adapting to external pressures 
such as environmental regulations. Alternative regulatory approaches 
currently implemented in the State of Oregon were also discussed as 
were compliance and enforcement practices for traditional regulatory 
strategies. 
Information from these interviews was used as background 
material to be combined with the survey results and literature search in 
developing the recommendation for this study. 
The following individuals participated in these interviews: 
Consultants: 
Rob Greenwood, Martha Prothro, Ross & Associates, Seattle, WA 
Janet Gillespie, Environmental Strategies, Portland, OR 
Ted Jones, Alliance to Save Energy, Washington, DC 
Academe: 
Dr. Craig Shinn, Portland State University, Public Administration, 
Portland, OR 
Greg Wheeler, Oregon State University, Industrial Assessment Center, 
Corvallis, OR 
Federal Environmental Agency: 
Walt Stevenson, US EPA, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 
Fred Dimmick, US EPA, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina 106
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Interview Participants 
State Environmental Agency: 
All of the following are staff at the Oregon Department of Environmental 
Quality: 
Sandy Gurkewitz, Pollution Prevention, Portland, OR 
Nancy Couch, Enforcement and Compliance, Portland, OR 
Bart Collinsworth, Hazardous Waste, Salem, OR 
Kevin Masterson, Hazardous Waste, Portland, OR 
Les Car lough, Enforcement and Compliance, Portland, OR 
Sarah Armitage, Air Quality, Portland, OR 
Marianne Fitzgerald, Air Quality, Portland, OR 
David Rozelle, Toxic Use Reduction, Salem, OR 
Jim Villendre, Hazardous Waste, Portland, OR 
George Davis, Air Quality, Portland, OR 
Holly Shroeder, Green Permits Program, Portland, OR 
Larry Schurr, Hazardous Waste, Portland, OR 
Larry Cwick, Enforcement and Compliance, Portland, OR 
Nina DeConcini, Air Quality, Portland, OR 
City Agency: 
Margaret Reich, City of Portland, Bureau of Environmental Services 
Industry: 
David Berg, Simpson Timber Company, Portland, OR 107 
Table 1 
Regulatory Tools Assessment Criteria 
EPA/State Implementation Plan Requirements (SIP) 
Clean Air Act Amendments
 
Federal rules; guidance
 
EPA Region 10 policy
 
Attainment/Maintenance Plan SIP submittals
 
Air Quality and Cross Media Impacts 
Incentives for voluntary, early reductions
 
Net air quality benefit
 
Real, actual reductions versus paper reductions
 
Avoid double counting reductions
 
Protect benefit of natural turnover
 
Attainment/Maintenance Plan SIP submittals
 
Health and welfare impacts
 
Cross media impacts
 
Industry Impact 
Cost effectiveness of compliance
 
Operational flexibility
 
Practical implementation
 
Growth in nonattainment area
 
Timeliness of processing
 
ROI on control investments
 
Impact on employment
 
Provide regulatory certainty
 
Adaptable to technology changes
 
Encourage technological innovation
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Table 1 (Continued) 
Regulatory Tools Assessment Criteria 
Environmental Agency Staff Impacts 
Processing/review time
 
Number of actions requiring review
 
Progam cost
 
Complexity of implementation
 
Training requirements
 
Impact on workload: re-prioritization
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Table 2 
Effectiveness of Regulatory Tools in Addressing
 
Competing Interests
 
Environmental Results 
1.  Design standards 
Reliable in assuring environmental results; but most heavily criticized as 
restricting industry choice. Administratively burdensome to industry 
and agency. 
2.  Performance-based standards 
Fairly reliable environmental results; some performance uncertainty due 
to unspecified control technology, which could be addressed by 
compliance assurance factors established in permits. 
3.  Emissions Trading 
Critics argue there are quantification problems. Proponents say the 
improved flexibility will lead to reductions that will outweigh 
quantification uncertanties. Improved monitoring capabilities at sources 
could improve compliance assurance. Also, requirement for additional 
reductions in exchange for flexibility could improve use of this 
instrument. 
4.  Mandatory Public Disclosures 
May lead to emission reductions depending on firm response to public 
pressure. May have limited application both in terms of its effect on 
emission reductions and who administers (e.g., studies found disclosures 
that were expected by the market had little or no effect in firm behavior; 
third-party, not agency should initate to relieve agency of political 
pressure, unless under agency enforcement action). 
5.  Technical Assistance 
May lead to emission reductions. 110
 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Effectiveness of Regulatory Tools in Addressing
 
Competing Interests
 
6.  Pollution Prevention 
May lead to emission reductions. One study conducted by Ross & 
Associates (1995) suggested the evidence was very strong that pollution 
prevention "planning" resulted in more and quicker reductions in 
hazardous substance use and hazardous waste generation than would 
have occurred without pollution prevention efforts. 
Industry Impacts 
1.  Design Standards 
Cited as least cost-effective policy choice. May restrict industry choice in 
control technology. 
2.  Performance-Based standards 
Provides more industry flexibility than design standards. But, as noted 
above, may result in less certain environmental results when compared 
to other policy tools unless compliance assurance is specifically 
addressed under enforceable conditions in permits. 
3.  Emissions Trading 
One of more cost-effective policy choices since industry can choose what 
emitting units are most cost-effective to produce emission reductions. 
4.  Mandatory Public Disclosure 
Impact to industry can be significant as noted in studies on stock value 
drops after Toxic Release Inventory disclosures. However, can be cost-
effective as sources can choose where, or if to reduce emissions as result 
of public pressure. 111
 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Effectiveness of Regulatory Tools in Addressing
 
Competing Interests
 
5.  Technical Assistance
 
Cost-effective. Very flexible regulatory tool.
 
6.  Pollution Prevention 
Can be cost-effective. Flexible regulatory tool. 
Agency Demands 
1.  Design Standards 
Heavy administrative burden, but, standards easier to set under this 
approach than performance-based. Reliable outcome. 
2.  Performance-Based standards 
Can result in additional administrative burden as agency needs to 
confirm source control-choice capable of meeting standards. 
3.  Emissions Trading 
Can result in additional administrative burden as agencies have to 
establish compliance assurance for two sources involved in trade, 
instead of one source under another policy approach. Resource-
intensive to quantify reduction, and continue compliance assurance for 
two sources throughout life of trade (necessitates maintaining records on 
both sources for several years, coordination of permits, etc.). But 
increased reductions resulting from allowing firms flexibility in trading 
may offset agency impacts. 
4.  Mandatory Public Disclosure 
Little agency demand. This regulatory tool would shift most of the 
implementation demand from agency to industry. 112 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Effectiveness of Regulatory Tools in Addressing 
Competing Interests 
5.  Technical Assistance 
Can be very resource-intensive but there is strong evidence that 
increased technical assistance improves environmental compliance. 
6.  Pollution Prevention 
See Technical Assistance above. 